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RE-INVENTING ARBITRATION: HOW
EXPANDING THE SCOPE OF ARBITRATION
IS RE-SHAPING ITS FORM AND BLURRING
THE LINE BETWEEN PRIVATE AND PUBLIC
ADJUDICATION
Deborah R. Hensler* & Damira Khatam†
Contemporary academic research and scholarship are highly specialized.
Legal scholarship on arbitration reflects this trend. There is extensive literature
on domestic arbitration jurisprudence, on international commercial arbitration
practice, and on investor-state arbitration procedure, and there are debates
about the appropriate use of arbitration within all of these domains. But few of
the participants in these debates are attentive to developments outside their own
domains, and there are few examples of scholarship surveying trends across the
three domains. Undertaking that analysis reveals important similarities in the
challenges facing arbitration in each domain and in the responses to these challenges. Looking across all three domains—domestic arbitration within the United
States, international commercial arbitration, and investor-state arbitration—we
observe an expanding application of arbitration beyond purely private disputes to
disputes with significant public policy dimensions. In response, there is increasing pressure in all three domains to incorporate in arbitration measures traditionally associated with public courts, including due process protections, public
appointment of adjudicators, and process and outcome transparency. The result
is a new form of dispute resolution, neither wholly private nor fully public, and
satisfying neither those who promote the virtues of private dispute resolution nor
those who insist that public courts are the proper locus for disputes with important public policy implications. We argue that re-inventing arbitration to adhere to public justice norms risks undermining its value for private actors with
private disputes, while at the same time undermining courts as institutions for
public contest over public policy issues. Rather than adding the trappings of public adjudication to arbitration, we should re-think the scope of arbitration in domestic and international spheres.
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INTRODUCTION
Contemporary academic research and scholarship are highly specialized.
Legal scholarship on arbitration reflects this trend. There is extensive literature
on domestic arbitration jurisprudence, on international commercial arbitration
practice, and on investor-state arbitration procedure, but few examples of
scholarship surveying trends across domains.1 Law schools offer separate

1

Recent dispute resolution scholarship has begun to cross national boundaries but not the
three arbitration domains that are the subject of this article. See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Diffusing Disputes: The Public in the Private of Arbitration, the Private in Courts, and the Erasure
of Rights, 124 YALE L.J. 2804, 2930–31 (2015) (focusing mainly on U.S. developments but
incorporating references to EU law and policy). Some authors caution against inferring anything about developments in one domain from observations of developments in another. See,
e.g., Rémy Gerbay, Is the End Nigh Again? An Empirical Assessment of the “Judicialization” of International Arbitration, 25 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 223 n.3 (2014) (arguing that
“there are different dynamics at play internationally and domestically, which render domestic and international arbitration difficult to compare.”).
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courses on arbitration in domestic and international spheres, and casebooks for
instructional use reflect this divide.2
Within each of these arbitration domains—domestic, international commercial, and international investment—there are disputes about arbitration policy and practice. Recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions upholding the use of
mandatory arbitration clauses to preclude class actions3 have evoked a storm of
controversy4 and led to legislative and regulatory efforts to outlaw such claus-

2

See, e.g., THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, ARBITRATION IN A NUTSHELL (3d ed. 2012) (summary
of U.S. law with a section on international commercial arbitration); THOMAS E.
CARBONNEAU, CASES AND MATERIALS ON ARBITRATION LAW AND PRACTICE (7th ed. 2015)
(focusing on U.S. law with particular attention to recent U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence
but including a section on international commercial arbitration); CHRISTOPHER R.
DRAHOZAL, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: CASES AND PROBLEMS (3d ed. 2013) (focusing on
U.S. domestic arbitration but including two chapters on enforcing international arbitration
agreements and international arbitration awards); PETER B. RUTLEDGE, ARBITRATION AND
THE CONSTITUTION (2013) (U.S. constitutional framework for arbitration); KATHERINE V.W.
STONE ET AL., ARBITRATION LAW (3d ed. 2015) (focusing on U.S. law regarding arbitration
with additional material on court-connected non-binding arbitration). For discussion on the
international use of arbitration, see, for example, GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION: CASE AND MATERIALS (2d ed. 2015) (focusing on international arbitration, but
including a section on “supportive” national law in the United States, England, France and
Switzerland and selected materials on investor-state arbitration); GARY B. BORN,
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: LAW AND PRACTICE (2d ed. 2016) (summary of material covered in casebook, including a chapter on investor-state arbitration); GARY B. BORN,
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (2d ed. 2014) (This three-volume set is widely
regarded as the leading reference on international commercial arbitration. As described by its
author, “[t]he treatise’s focus is expressly international, focusing on how both developed and
other jurisdictions around the world give effect to . . . [international agreements]. . . . Every
effort is made to avoid adopting purely national solutions, without consideration of international and comparative perspectives.”) Id. at 5. Born’s treatment of international commercial
arbitration is openly celebrated. See generally TOWARDS A SCIENCE OF INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION: COLLECTED EMPIRICAL RESEARCH (Christopher R. Drahozal & Richard W.
Naimark eds., 2005). As the use of investor-state arbitration has grown, specialized volumes
on that form of arbitration have also emerged. See, e.g., CAMPBELL MCLACHLAN ET AL.,
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT ARBITRATION: SUBSTANTIVE PRINCIPLES (2d ed. 2017); NOAH
RUBINS & BEN LOVE, PROVISIONAL MEASURES IN INVESTMENT ARBITRATION (forthcoming
June 2018); J. ROMESH WEERAMANTRY, TREATY INTERPRETATION IN INVESTMENT
ARBITRATION (2012). But see THOMAS HALE, BETWEEN INTERESTS AND LAW: THE POLITICS
OF TRANSNATIONAL COMMERCIAL DISPUTES (2015) (placing the evolution of arbitration law
in the framework of international politics and governance).
3
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 352 (2011) (upholding consumer contract clause precluding subscribers from proceeding against the defendant in collective
form); Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2310–11 (2013) (upholding
commercial contract precluding small business from proceeding against the defendant in collective form notwithstanding likelihood that this will deny vindication of rights).
4
See, e.g., Einer Elhauge, How Italian Colors Guts Private Antitrust Enforcement by Replacing it with Ineffective Forms of Arbitration, 38 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 771, 771 (2015); J.
Maria Glover, Disappearing Claims and the Erosion of Substantive Law, 124 YALE L.J.
3052, 3091–92 (2015).
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es.5 Earlier U.S. Supreme Court decisions extending arbitration to statutory
claims, including civil rights claims,6 were similarly controversial.7
Controversy in the international commercial arbitration domain focuses on
practice rather than on jurisprudence. Early critics of business-to-business
commercial arbitration targeted outcomes more than process, as business disputants and their lawyers complained that arbitrators often “split the baby”—i.e.
delivered compromise awards—rather than applying decisional rules based on
law or industry norms.8 But recent criticism focuses on the increasing time and
expense of arbitration (both in domestic and international domains) as parties
have imported American-style discovery, including voluminous document exchange, interrogatories, and depositions9 into what was traditionally envisioned

5

See Sylvan Lane, House Votes to Repeal Consumer Arbitration Rule, HILL (July 25, 2017,
5:09
PM),
http://thehill.com/policy/finance/343652-house-votes-to-repeal-consumerfinancial-protection-bureau-rule [https://perma.cc/SD2D-YFUT] A companion Senate measure was briefly derailed by controversy over a massive security breach at Equifax. See Aída
Chávez et al., After Equifax Breach, GOP Senators Don’t Yet Have Votes to Overturn Critical Rule That Protects Consumers, INTERCEPT (Sept. 28, 2017, 1:58 PM),
https://theintercept.com/2017/09/28/republicans-equifax-consumer-protection
rule/
[https://perma.cc/98EL-3D2S]. On Nov. 1, 2017, the President signed a joint resolution
passed by Congress disapproving the Arbitration Agreements Rule under the Congressional
Review Act (CRA). Pursuant to the joint resolution, the Arbitration Agreements Rule no
longer has force or effect. On Nov. 22, 2017, the Bureau published a notice removing the
Arbitration Agreements Rule from the Code of Federal Regulations. The materials relating
to the Arbitration Agreements Rule on the Bureau’s website are for reference only.
6
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 630–31 (1985)
(holding that the defendant’s antitrust claims were arbitrable); Shearson/Am. Express Inc. v.
McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 242 (1987) (holding that claims under RICO and the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934 can be arbitrated); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S.
20, 35 (1991) (holding that claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967
are arbitrable).
7
See, e.g., Jean R. Sternlight, Compelling Arbitration of Claims Under the Civil Rights Act
of 1866: What Congress Could Not Have Intended, 47 U. KAN. L. REV. 273, 281 (1999);
Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1631,
1632 (2005) [hereinafter Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration]; Katherine Van Wezel
Stone, Mandatory Arbitration of Individual Employment Rights: The Yellow Dog Contract of
the 1990s, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 1017, 1022 (1996).
8
See, e.g., Stephanie E. Keer & Richard W. Naimark, Arbitrators Do Not “Split the Baby”:
Empirical Evidence from International Business Arbitrations, 18 J. INT’L ARB. 573 (2001)
(citing assertions that such behavior exists and presenting empirical evidence from a small
sample of international commercial arbitration awards that contravenes the perception);
DOUGLAS SHONTZ ET AL., RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, BUSINESS-TO-BUSINESS
ARBITRATION IN THE UNITED STATES: PERCEPTIONS OF CORPORATE COUNSEL 11 (2011),
https://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/TR781.html [https://perma.cc/5KRT-M49V].
9
As discussed infra Sections II.C, III.B, parties and lawyers often describe the process of
arbitration with extensive discovery and more formalized procedures as the “judicialization”
of arbitration. See, e.g., Gerbay, supra note 1, at 224. Note, however, that Gerbay finds that
empirical evidence does not support the claim of “judicialization” of international commercial arbitration. See discussion infra Section II.C.
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as a streamlined presentation of evidence followed by swift decision-making.10
Available data suggest that the increase in procedural complexity can be linked
to an increase in the fraction of disputes referred to arbitration that are complex: disputes involving more than two parties, high financial stakes, and complicated facts and law.11 Whereas disputes resulting from routine cross-border
trading were once the staples of international commercial arbitration, now
many arbitrated disputes arise out of activities in heavily regulated industries,
including energy, telecommunications, and information technology,12 involving
additional layers of complexity.
Like the controversies that have arisen over the past several decades regarding domestic arbitration in the United States, controversy regarding investor-state arbitration is chiefly about policy. As discussed infra, investor-state
arbitration was designed to provide an alternative for foreign investors to bring
suit against a sovereign nation in that nation’s domestic courts when the sovereign entity allegedly breached a contract.13 However, critics argue that increasingly multi-national corporations are using the procedure to challenge democratically-adopted health, safety, and environmental protection regulations.14
Procedure is central to the debate over investor-state arbitration not because of
concern about time and expense (as with regard to international commercial arbitration), but rather because critics view it as illegitimate for public policy disputes to be decided behind closed doors by private individuals who are privately paid.15 Controversy over investor-state arbitration heated up in the past
several years as national trade representatives were negotiating multilateral
trade agreements (e.g. the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP) and the
Trans-Atlantic Investment and Partnership Agreement) that included clauses
10

See, e.g., Karen Willcutts, Arbitration: Still an Effective Method of Resolving Business
Disputes?, DALL. B. ASS’N (Mar. 3, 2016, 4:37 PM), http://www.dallasbar.org/bookpage/arbitration-still-effective-method-resolving-business-disputes [https://perma.cc/TC5NL72F] (advising arbitration counsel to negotiate with in-house counsel to adapt arbitration
clauses intended for simple transactions in order to meet the needs of complex disputes for
scheduling orders, agreements regarding production of documents, limits on dispositive orders and sophisticated briefing).
11
Gerbay, supra note 1, at 241–44. Gerbay’s analysis relies on two decades of caseload data
from the International Chamber of Commerce, a leading provider of international commercial arbitration.
12
Id. at 240 n.83.
13
See infra Section III.A.
14
LISE JOHNSON ET AL., COLUMBIA CTR. ON SUSTAINABLE INV., INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT, PUBLIC INTEREST AND U.S. DOMESTIC LAW 1 (2015), http://ccsi.columbia.edu/fi
les/2015/05/Investor-State-Dispute-Settlement-Public-Interest-and-U.S.-Domestic-LawFINAL-May-19-8.pdf [https://perma.cc/L78Y-UQR7].
15
Id. at 3. “ISDS provides significant substantive and procedural rights to individuals and
corporations based solely on their foreign nationality, and outsources development and interpretation of law to private arbitrators insulated from crucial checks and balances. Through
this grant of rights and transfer of lawmaking power, ISDS threatens to undermine legal systems and policymaking at the domestic level.” Id. “ISDS” is a catch-all phrase used to refer
collectively to different investor-state arbitration protocols and procedures:
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mandating that disputes that arose under the treaties would be resolved via investor-state arbitration.16
Controversies within each of the three domains reflect different historical
circumstances and political dynamics. However, a common cause of controversy is the expansion of the scope of arbitration in each domain to disputes for
which the procedure arguably was not originally intended, particularly disputes
with significant public policy dimensions. The most frequent response to criticism of this expansion in each domain has been to adapt arbitration procedures
to resemble more closely public adjudicative procedures: to strengthen due process by relying more heavily on documentary evidence and live witness testimony and by requiring reasoned decisions, and to de-privatize the process by
publishing arbitration awards, and (in the case of investor-state arbitration) to
open up the process to third-parties, including inviting amicus briefs.17
In the United States, to shore up the legitimacy of arbitrations that result
from form contracts (i.e. “contracts of adhesion”), some arbitration providers
have voluntarily incorporated due process protections into their procedures and
enhanced transparency with regard to process and outcomes.18 In international
commercial arbitration, pressure to make the arbitration process more court-like
has come from users themselves, even though they complain about the effects
on time to disposition and expense.19 Pressure to reject arbitration altogether is
strongest in the investment domain, where non-governmental organizations
(NGO)—sometimes with the support of public officials—have led a movement
to substitute a new, publicly administered and publicly funded adjudicative
mechanism, with public access to process and outcomes, for investor-state arbitration as currently designed and operated.
Re-inventing a procedure designed for resolving private disputes to decide
instead disputes with significant public policy dimensions risks diminishing the
value of private dispute resolution for truly private disputes without fully satisfying the need for public dispute resolution for public disputes. We argue that it
is time to more carefully analyze what disputes are most appropriately assigned
to private and public procedures, rather than further blurring the line between
private and public dispute resolution, lest we destroy what is valuable in both
public and private procedures.
The goal of this article is to assist in that analysis by presenting, side-byside, brief histories of the establishment and evolution of arbitration in domestic, international commercial, and investor-state domains, and by highlighting
the similarities among the challenges arbitration has encountered recently in
16

For detailed discussion, see infra Section III.B.
See infra Section II.C.
18
See infra Section I.C, for discussion on the due process and transparency procedures incorporated in consumer and employment arbitration.
19
In the past few years, major international arbitral institutions responded to the concerns
about time and cost by adopting special expedited procedures for smaller, less complex disputes or based on the parties’ agreement. See discussion infra Section I.D.
17
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each domain and among the responses to these challenges. Part II describes the
evolution of arbitration in the United States, focusing on recent controversies.
Part III discusses the parallel evolution of international commercial arbitration.
Part IV discusses the historical background of investor-state arbitration, the
public law framework that authorizes its use, and controversies about its use
that have erupted in the past several years. The last Part concludes.
In recent years, some commentators have incorporated arbitration in general treatments of “alternative dispute resolution (ADR),” without distinguishing carefully among different procedures.20 The discussion that follows adopts
a traditional definition of arbitration: a binding adjudication of a dispute by private decision-makers outside a public court system.21 We occasionally mention
other dispute resolution procedures that may be used instead of or in addition to
arbitration, such as mediation or other forms of conciliation or court-annexed
non-binding arbitration.
Arbitration is used in a wide variety of circumstances, including to assist in
the resolution of state-to-state disputes. This article focuses narrowly on arbitration, not ADR generally, and on the resolution of private disputes.
In opting for breadth, we necessarily give up depth. As described above,
there is rich literature in each of the three domains this article discusses. None
of our accounts does justice to the research and analyses that have been conducted by scholars and practitioners within each of these domains. We hope
that introducing readers from one domain to developments in parallel domains
will stimulate new thinking about appropriate and inappropriate uses of arbitration and potential reforms in arbitration law, rules, and practice.22
I.

PRIVATIZING THE PUBLIC IN U.S. DOMESTIC ARBITRATION

A. Early Evolution of U.S. Federal Arbitration Law
While the “alternative dispute resolution (ADR)” movement arose in the
late twentieth century, arbitration dates back to colonial times in the United

20

For a critique of this trend, see Jean R. Sternlight, Is Binding Arbitration a Form of
ADR?: An Argument That the Term “ADR” Has Begun to Outlive Its Usefulness, 2000 J.
DISP. RESOL. 97, 97–98 (2000).
21
Id. at 99–100.
22
Labor arbitration conducted under collective bargaining agreements constitutes a fourth
important domain of arbitration law and practice. We follow traditional arbitration jurisprudence in distinguishing labor arbitration from commercial arbitration. For a discussion of
this traditional distinction and argument that the distinction has become inappropriate since
the U.S. Supreme Court has embraced an expansive view of the Federal Arbitration Act, see
Stephen L. Hayford, The Federal Arbitration Act: Key to Stabilizing and Strengthening the
Law of Labor Arbitration, 21 BERKELEY J. EMPL. & LAB. L. 521 (2000). Comparative analysis of trends in labor arbitration was beyond the scope of our present effort.
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States.23 American colonialists carried with them from Europe the belief that
merchants within various business communities should be free to resolve their
disagreements outside of court, in private, and according to rules that they designed rather than dealing with the technicalities and uncertainties of common
law.24 Merchants doing business together agreed to refer their disputes to arbitrators selected from their own industry, who would decide the disputes in accord with that industry’s norms and without much attention to procedural technicalities.25 Arbitration took place outside of public view and the outcomes
were confidential. Merchants preferred arbitration because they believed it was
quicker and cheaper than litigation and because they believed specialist arbitrators understood the nature of commercial transactions better than generalist
judges; they also appreciated its confidentiality.26
However, from time to time, one of the parties to such an agreement would
try to wriggle out of arbitration by asking a court to void the contract’s arbitration provision or to deny enforcement of an arbitration judgment. Before the
20th century, many judges were responsive to these requests.27 Unhappy with
this state of affairs, the business community pressed for substantive legal reform to ensure the enforceability of arbitration agreements and awards,28 and in
1920, New York passed an Arbitration Act compelling state court judges to enforce arbitration agreements.29 Five years later, in response to business lobbying, Congress enacted the United States Arbitration Act—later retitled the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)30—modeled after the New York arbitration
statute.31 The FAA’s stated purpose was to put arbitration agreements on “equal
footing” with other contracts and overcome “judicial hostility to arbitration.”32
23

KYRIAKI NOUSSIA, CONFIDENTIALITY IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: A
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE POSITION UNDER ENGLISH, GERMAN, AND FRENCH LAW 13
(2010).
24
JEROLD S. AUERBACH, JUSTICE WITHOUT LAW? 32 (1983); see also discussion infra Part
III.
25
IMRE STEPHEN SZALAI, OUTSOURCING JUSTICE: THE RISE OF MODERN ARBITRATION LAWS
IN AMERICA 20 (2013).
26
AUERBACH, supra note 24, at 32–33.
27
Jodi Wilson, How the Supreme Court Thwarted the Purpose of the Federal Arbitration
Act, 63 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 91, 98–99 (2012) (citing KATHERINE V.W. STONE & RICHARD
A. BALES, ARBITRATION LAW 22 (2d ed. 2010)); see also Paul D. Carrington & Paul Y. Castle, The Revocability of Contract Provisions Controlling Resolution of Future Disputes Between the Parties, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 207, 208–09 (2004).
28
AUERBACH, supra note 24, at 102–03 (discussing the efforts of various merchant communities, including the New York Stock Exchange, the Chicago Board of Trade, and the fur,
silk, cotton, and other industries to expand and legalize arbitration).
29
Wilson, supra note 27, at 99.
30
9 U.S.C. § 1 (1925). The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) does not apply to arbitration
agreements under collective bargaining agreements. Wright v. Universal Maritime Service
Corp. 525 U.S. 70, 82 (1998).
31
Wilson, supra note 27, at 99–100.
32
Id. at 93 & n.9 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 1–2 (1924); S. REP. NO. 68-536, at 2
(1924)).
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Arbitration was perceived and promoted as an inexpensive, speedy, efficient,
and final means of resolving commercial disputes.33 Finality was assured by
incorporating in the FAA a provision strictly limiting the grounds for appeal,
essentially to actual corruption or fraud.34
In its early case law interpreting the applicability of the FAA, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized arbitration’s limitations on due process: no right to a
jury trial where such would be available in a public court, lack of reasoned
opinions, relaxed evidentiary standards, no formal right to discovery, and only
very limited appellate review.35 The Court acknowledged that these limitations
could have a substantial impact on the outcomes of disputants’ substantive
claims and that some tribunals, by their very nature, are more suitable for certain types of disputes than others.36 The Court’s jurisprudence supporting arbitration notwithstanding these limitations rested on three key assumptions: (1)
that parties should be free to choose their preferred mode of dispute resolution;
(2) that arbitration provisions, freely contracted for, represented the parties’
judgments that the benefits of agreeing to arbitrate disputes that might arise in
the course of their business transaction outweighed the costs; and (3) that once
parties had chosen arbitration, they should be held to their choice (as would be
true with regard to any other contractual provision). In U.S. federal jurisprudence, arbitration gained “same footing” with court adjudication as a mechanism for resolving disputes arising out of contract law.37
B. The Expansion of Arbitration to Disputes Involving Public Policy
Doctrines
By the 1970s, American courts had begun to embrace alternative dispute
resolution, which judges perceived as a more efficient and more satisfactory
way of resolving civil disputes and—perhaps, not inconsequentially—a means
of relieving trial court workloads.38 In the preceding decade, the U.S. Supreme
33

Paul L. Sayre, Development of Commercial Arbitration Law, 37 YALE L.J. 595, 595–96
(1928).
34
9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (2002).
35
See, e.g., Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., Inc., 350 U.S. 198, 202–03 (1956); Wilko
v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 435–37 (1953), overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am.
Exp., Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
36
Bernhardt, 350 U.S. at 203 (“The nature of the tribunal where suits are tried is an important part of the parcel of rights behind a cause of action.”).
37
See Wilson, supra note 27, at 93.
38
Harry T. Edwards, Commentary, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema?,
99 HARV. L. REV. 668, 668–70 (1986); Deborah R. Hensler, Our Courts, Ourselves: How the
Alternative Dispute Resolution Movement Is Re-Shaping Our Legal System, 108 PENN ST. L.
REV. 165, 165, 178 (2003). The inception of the ADR movement is normally traced to Prof.
Frank Sander’s address to the Pound Conference on Causes of Public Dissatisfaction with
the Administration of Justice, convened by then U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice Warren
Burger. See Frank E.A. Sander, Varieties of Dispute Processing, Address Delivered at the
National Conference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of
Justice (Apr. 7–9, 1976), in 70 F.R.D. 79, 111 (1976). On the notion that the U.S. Supreme
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Court had begun to shift from the “equal footing” doctrine to a policy favoring
arbitration.39 In 1983, the Court made this policy explicit in Moses H. Cone
Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp., declaring that section two
of the FAA reflected “a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements,
notwithstanding any state substantive or procedural policies to the contrary.”40
Although, after 1925, many states had adopted statutes modeled after the FAA,
in the 1980s, some states limited the use of arbitration in some circumstances.
In 1985, the U.S. Supreme Court held that under the Commerce Clause of the
U.S. Constitution, the FAA preempted state arbitration law, including such limitations.41 Henceforth, it was the U.S. Supreme Court that determined the reach
of arbitration doctrine.42
Having positioned itself as the sole interpreter of the scope of the FAA, the
U.S. Supreme Court embarked on a process of authorizing the use of arbitration
for a wide range of disputes, including those arising out of statutory and constitutional law—arguably far beyond the remit intended by the U.S. Congress in
the 1920s.43 In essence, the Court held that whenever parties agree to a contract
incorporating an arbitration clause, they are bound to arbitrate any dispute that
arises between them that can be construed as falling within the scope of the
contract, without regard to the substantive legal basis of the claim.44 The Court
Court’s arbitration jurisprudence has been shaped at least in part by perceptions of court
overload, see, for example, G. Richard Shell, The Role of Public Law in Private Dispute
Resolution: Reflections on Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 26 AM. BUS. L.J.
397, 397–98 (1988).
39
E.g., Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 402 (1967); see also
Wilson, supra note 27, at 102; Resnik, supra note 1, at 2804.
40
Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).
41
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984). Justice Sandra Day O’Connor dissented
from this opinion but subsequently joined the majority in supporting the broad scope of the
FAA on stare decisis grounds. Today, only Justice Clarence Thomas (who joined the court
long after Southland was decided) dissents from the majority’s view that the FAA preempts
state arbitration law.
42
Examples of state laws that attempted to limit the use of arbitration based on public policy
concerns, and that were preempted by the FAA, include state laws that require litigation of
wage disputes, Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 491 (1987); laws prohibiting arbitral awards
with punitive damages, Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 54, 56
(1995); laws that lodge primary jurisdiction of certain types of labor disputes with the state’s
commissioner, Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 356 (2008); or general public policy prohibition against agreements to arbitrate personal injury or wrongful death claims against nursing
homes, Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 565 U.S. 530, 533 (2012).
43
See, e.g., Sales and Contracts to Sell in Interstate and Foreign Commerce, and Federal
Commercial Arbitration: Hearing on S. 4213 and S. 4214 Before a Subcomm. of the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 67th Cong. 9 (1923) (statement of W.H.H. Piatt) (testifying that the
FAA was not intended to “be an act referring to labor disputes, at all. It is purely an act to
give the merchants the right or the privilege of sitting down and agreeing with each other as
to what their damages are, if they want to do it.”); see also Wilson, supra note 27, at 98–99.
44
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 630–31 (1985)
(holding that the defendant’s antitrust claims were arbitrable); Shearson/Am. Express Inc. v.
McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 221 (1987) (holding that claims under RICO and the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934 can be arbitrated); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S.
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also overturned state legislative efforts to warn parties that by agreeing to arbitrate they are giving up their rights to go to court.45 Over time, most state supreme courts adopted the U.S. Supreme Court’s strict interpretation of the enforceability of arbitration clauses regardless of the substantive legal basis of a
claim.46
Recognizing the opportunity to keep consumers’ and workers’ claims out
of court—and away from jury trial and possibly punitive damage awards47—
corporate counsel soon began to include arbitration clauses in a wide range of
contracts of adhesion (i.e. form contracts).48 Consumer and worker advocates
attacked such contracts on grounds of unconscionability, but without success.49
Attempts to evade arbitration on procedural grounds—for example, arguments
that arbitration providers’ fees frequently exceeded court filing fees50—also
went nowhere. In fairly short order, consumers (including insurance subscribers
and medical patients) and employees found that they were barred from taking
their claims to court.51
As U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence was becoming more protective of
consumer and employment contracts forcing individual plaintiffs to arbitrate
claims rather than take them to court, consumer class actions appeared to be on
20, 35 (1991) (holding claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act are arbitrable); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 109 (2001) (holding employment
claims generally are arbitrable) (abrogating Craft v. Campbell Soup Co., 177 F.3d 1083 (9th
Cir. 1998) (interpreting the FAA as inapplicable to any labor or employment contracts, citing
Sec. 1 of the Act)). Justices Stevens and Souter (with whom Justices Ginsburg and Breyer
joined) observed that the FAA’s well-documented legislative history makes it clear that it
was not intended to apply to any labor or employment disputes. Id. at 127–28, 136 (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
45
Doctor’s Assoc. Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 683 (1996) (striking down a Montana
statute and holding that requiring warning language in special large format treated arbitration
contracts differently than other contracts, thereby violating the purpose of the FAA).
46
KATHERINE V.W. STONE, PRIVATE JUSTICE: THE LAW OF ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE
RESOLUTION 542–45, 594–97 (2000).
47
Although some states historically prohibited waivers of punitive damages in arbitration,
e.g., Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 793, 797 (N.Y. 1976), contemporary decisions
hold that parties may include prohibitions on punitive damages in arbitration contracts. Absent such explicit prohibitions, arbitrators may award punitive damages. See, e.g., Stark v.
Sandberg, Phoenix & Von Gontard, P.C., 381 F.3d 793 (8th Cir. 2004).
48
FAA’s legislative history suggests that the drafters of the Act did not intend it to apply to
“take it or leave it” standard contracts between parties of unequal bargaining power reasoning that such contracts are “not really voluntary contracts, in a strict sense.” SZALAI, supra
note 25, at 195 (referring to Senator Walsh’s concerns during Sales and Contracts to Sell in
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, and Federal Commercial Arbitration: Hearing on S.
4213 and S. 4214 Before a Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 67th Cong. 10
(1923)).
49
STONE, supra note 46, at 594–97.
50
Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 91 (2000) (rejecting challenge to
arbitration based on potential expense).
51
Mandatory pre-dispute arbitration in consumer and employment contexts is a uniquely
American phenomenon, distinguishing U.S. arbitration from domestic arbitration in other
countries. See Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration, supra note 7, at 1646.
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the rise.52 For corporations, class actions posed much more financial risk than
individual actions, whether litigated or arbitrated. Recognizing yet another opportunity, corporate counsel began including bars to class actions in mandatory
pre-dispute arbitration clauses.53 Initial judicial response to these clauses varied, with some courts allowing arbitrators to decide whether a clause contemplated class arbitration and other courts severing and voiding bars against class
actions included in arbitration clauses on grounds of unconscionability, while
allowing the clauses to remain enforceable with regard to individual claims.54
In 2011, the U.S. Supreme Court, in AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion,55ended
all questioning about the enforceability of mandatory pre-dispute arbitration
clauses barring claimants from pursuing their claims in collective proceedings,
whether in litigation or arbitration, reversing the Ninth Circuit’s prior decision
voiding the provision on grounds of unconscionability. Two years later, the enforceability of class action waivers in mandatory arbitration clauses came before the Court again, this time in anti-trust litigation by small businesses against
American Express. In American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant,56 the
businesses challenging the bar to proceeding collectively harkened back to the
widely cited dictum in the Court’s 1985 opinion in Mitsubishi Motors v. Soler
Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., in which the majority noted that an arbitration agreement might be deemed unenforceable on public policy grounds if it prevented
“effective vindication” of a “right to pursue statutory remedies.”57 The putative
class representative in Italian Colors argued that only a class (or other group)
can effectively pursue complex and expensive anti-trust litigation.58 Writing for
the majority, Justice Antonin Scalia opined that the fact that it might be too expensive to pursue a statutory claim in individual arbitration was not equivalent
to eliminating the right to pursue the remedy, and therefore was not contrary to
the Court’s Mitsubishi dictum.59 Ironically, having embraced a public policy
favoring arbitration in part based on the perception that labor arbitration in the
collective bargaining context had produced industrial peace, the Court preclud-

52

DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS: PURSUING PUBLIC GOALS FOR
PRIVATE GAIN 51–68 (2000).
53
See generally Linda J. Demaine & Deborah R. Hensler, “Volunteering” to Arbitrate
through Predispute Arbitration Clauses: The Average Consumer’s Experience, 67 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 55 (2004). In the early 2000s, Hensler was at a corporate counsel meeting
at which including bars to class actions in mandatory arbitration clauses was recommended
as a strategy to combat consumer class actions.
54
See, e.g., Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003); Laster v. AT&T Mobility
LLC, 584 F.3d 849, 855 (9th Cir. 2009); Champ v. Siegel Trading Co., Inc., 55 F.3d 269
(7th Cir. 1995); Brennan v. Ace INA Holdings, Inc., No. 00-2730, 2002 WL 1804918 (E.D.
Pa. 2002); Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005).
55
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011).
56
Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest. (Italian Colors), 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013).
57
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637 n.19 (1985).
58
Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. at 2308–09.
59
Id. at 2310–11.
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ed the collective pursuit of remedies for collective harm in arbitration under the
Federal Arbitration Act.60
C. Responses to the Expansion of the Scope of Domestic Arbitration in the
United States
By expanding the substantive scope of arbitration, the U.S. Supreme
Court’s arbitration jurisprudence swept into arbitration’s embrace both a wider
variety of disputants and a different type of relationship between disputants. In
addition to disputes between commercial partners over contract terms and performance, arbitration now could be applied to disputes: between investors and
brokers over disclosure; between employees and employers about wrongful
termination and discrimination in hiring, promotion, and wages; between consumers and service providers over service and fees; and between patients and
health care providers over malpractice. As a consequence, arbitration was no
longer applied solely to relatively evenly-matched commercial partners, but also to wildly unequal employees and employers, consumers and corporations,
and patients and health care providers.61
The Court’s decisions evoked critical commentary by legal academicians
and practitioners and sometimes political opposition. More importantly for this
discussion, they led to significant changes in arbitration rules and practice.
Over time, domestic arbitration in the United States morphed from a private,
informal, streamlined dispute resolution process, subject to little external scrutiny, to a much more formal and quite a bit more public—and arguably more
expensive and time-consuming—procedure that increasingly resembles litigation.
1. Securities Arbitration
Arbitration was well established within the securities industry before the
Court’s 1987 decision in Shearson/Am. Express Inc. v. McMahon.62 Various
60

For commentary arguing that starting in the 1980s, the Court imported its positive labor
arbitration jurisprudence into its FAA jurisprudence, see Jonathan R. Nelson, Judge-Made
Law and the Presumption of Arbitrability: David L. Threlkeld & Co. v. Metallgesellschaft
Ltd., 58 BROOK. L. REV. 279 (1992) and Allison Anderson, Note, Labor and Commercial
Arbitration: The Court’s Misguided Merger, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1237 (2013).
61
See, e.g., SZALAI, supra note 25, at 11 (examining archival sources from the early 1900s,
including several hundred pages of memoranda and correspondence from the drafters of U.S.
arbitration laws and arguing that the Supreme Court “has grossly misinterpreted these laws
to support a system that is significantly more expansive than was originally intended”).
62
Shearson/Am. Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 238–42 (1987) (holding that
claims under RICO and the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 can be arbitrated). On the
early establishment of arbitration forums for disputes among brokers, see Kenneth Durr &
Robert Cooly, The Institution of Experience: Self-Regulatory Organizations in the Securities
Industry, 1792–2010, SEC. AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION HIST. SOC’Y (Dec. 1, 2010),
http://www.sechistorical.org/museum/galleries/sro/sro02d.php [https://perma.cc/M8TR-CY
T4].
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industry self-regulatory associations administered arbitrations under diverse
rules. In 1976, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) led an effort to
develop a uniform arbitration code for arbitrating investors’ claims, which was
subsequently adopted voluntarily by industry associations.63 By 1987, thousands of claims had been adjudicated under this code.64 The decision in
McMahon, placing investors’ contracts fully within the FAA’s scope, led to increased attention to securities arbitration’s procedures and outcomes.65 Shortly
after the decision was handed down, the SEC issued recommendations to the
industry’s leading trade associations for new procedural requirements, including pre-hearing discovery, transcripts of hearings, and closer assessment of arbitrators’ qualifications.66 Within five years, some industry associations were
also recommending that arbitrators follow the Federal Rules of Evidence and
some practitioners reported that it had become increasingly common for lawyers representing parties in securities arbitration to file briefs on relevant law.67
Some securities arbitration forums published awards along with parties’ and
arbitrators’ names and case summaries, including damages requested.68
Notwithstanding these changes, in the two decades following McMahon,
there was unceasing criticism of the securities arbitration paradigm: selfregulating industry organizations administering arbitrations between unhappy
investors and employees of the organizations’ own industry. A raft of reforms
promulgated by the SEC, which arguably had the effect of making arbitration
even more like litigation, did little to quell the controversy.69
Securities arbitrations are currently governed by an “Industry Code” issued
in 2007 by FINRA, the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority.70 The Code
includes rules for filing claims, location of hearings (required to be in the inves63

Constantine N. Katsoris, Securities Arbitration After McMahon, 16 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
361, 363 (1987) (citing Uniform Code of Arbitration (as amended), reprinted in FOURTH
REPORT OF THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY CONFERENCE ON ARBITRATION TO THE SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE COMMISSION Exhibit C (Nov. 1984)).
64
Constantine, supra note 63, at 364.
65
Id. at 361.
66
Id. at 369–70. Commenting presciently, Katsoris wrote: “The dangers in the postMcMahon era are efforts to recast arbitration as a clone to court litigation.” Id. at 370; see
also Norman S. Poser, When ADR Eclipses Litigation: The Brave New World of Securities
Arbitration, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 1095, 1105 (1993) (analogizing reactions post McMahon to
Prof. Higgins song in My Fair Lady, “Why Can’t a Woman Be More Like a Man,” substituting the words “Why Can’t Arbitration Be More Like Litigation?”).
67
Poser, supra note 66, at 1106–07.
68
Id. at 1107.
69
Jill I. Gross, McMahon Turns Twenty: The Regulation of Fairness in Securities Arbitration, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 493, 497, 516–19 (2008) (describing the controversy and arguing
that investors are adequately protected by SEC oversight of arbitration forums and that any
disadvantages experienced by investors are consequences of unfavorable substantive law,
not arbitration procedures).
70
Section 1300 Code of Arbitration Procedure for Industry Disputes, FINRA,
http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=4193
[https://perma.cc/D7Z5-9CRL] (last visited Dec. 22, 2017).
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tor’s location), selecting arbitrators, discovery and admissibility of evidence
(e.g. document production, depositions and expert witness testimony), hearings,
and awards. Hearings are recorded and awards must be written. Arbitration
awards, along with case summaries and parties and arbitrators’ names, must be
made publicly available.71
2. Employment Arbitration
After the U.S. Supreme Court held in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane
Corp.72 that the reach of the FAA extended to employment discrimination
claims,73 labor arbitrators—who represent employees and management in disputes that arise under collective bargaining agreements—became concerned
that the perception that non-unionized employees were being unfairly forced
into arbitration might undermine the credibility of labor arbitration as well. Between 1994 and 1995, the National Academy of Arbitrators convened a task
force comprising representatives from various organizations, including the
American Bar Association (ABA), American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU),
and National Employment Lawyers Association, to adopt principles for a “Due
Process Protocol” for arbitrating statutory employment claims. Later described
by Arnold Zack, the President of the National Academy of Arbitrators who
chaired the effort, as “a rather modest undertaking to protect the credibility of
labor management arbitration and to provide guidance to NAA arbitrators who
might be undertaking such [employment arbitration] work,”74 the protocol provides that employees should have a right to representation of their own choosing in arbitration, that employees should have access to “all information reasonably relevant to their claims” both before and during the hearing, including
pre-hearing depositions (i.e. at least minimal discovery), and that arbitrators
should issue written opinions and awards.75 The American Arbitration Associa71

Id. For a contemporary practitioner’s view of security arbitration, see Mark Astarita,
Overview of the Securities Arbitration Process, SEC LAW.COM, http://www.seclaw.com/over
view-securities-arbitration-process/ [https://perma.cc/P8FJ-XA68] (last visited Dec. 23,
2017).
72
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 23 (1991).
73
Notably, legislative history of the FAA shows that it was not intended to cover labor and
employment disputes. See SZALAI, supra note 25, at 152–53, 191–92 (referring, inter alia, to
testimony during Sales and Contracts to Sell in Interstate and Foreign Commerce, and Federal Commercial Arbitration: Hearing on S. 4213 and S. 4214 Before a Subcomm. of the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 67th Cong. 10 (1923) that the Act will have nothing to do with “labor disputes, at all.” “It is purely an act to give the merchants the right or the privilege of
sitting down and agreeing with each other as to what their damages are, if they want to do it.
Now, that is all there is in this.”).
74
LEE HORNBERGER, THE IMPACT OF THE DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL PRINCIPLES ON
ARBITRATION OF STATUTORY EMPLOYMENT DISPUTES IN MICHIGAN 1 (2007) (quoting Arnold
M. Zack, The Due Process Protocol: Getting There and Getting Over It, 11 EMP. RTS. &
EMP. POL’Y J. 257, 257 (2007)), http://www.leehornberger.com/index.php?page=Lee_Hornb
erger_Articles [https://perma.cc/3GY4-TZQ4].
75
Id. at 4.
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tion (AAA), the oldest non-profit arbitration provider in the United States and
JAMS, the leading for-profit provider of mediation and arbitration, as well as
other organizations, have adopted versions of this protocol,76 and some courts
have referred to it in assessing the fairness of arbitration contracts that are challenged.77 Some aspects of the protocol—e.g. regarding the selection of neutral
arbitrators and the holding of fair hearings—are simply restatements of FAA
provisions. However, the provisions regarding exchange of evidence are more
reflective of litigation norms than traditional arbitration procedures. While not
setting requirements regarding responsibility for paying arbitrators’ fees, the
protocol also goes beyond the U.S. Supreme Court’s summary dismissal of this
concern in Green Tree, by suggesting that at least in arbitrations involving
“lower paid employees,” employers should consider partially subsidizing
fees.78 The protocol explicitly declines to advise employers on the propriety of
pre-dispute arbitration clauses. But the AAA currently advises potential clients
that it may decline to administer arbitrations if the client’s dispute resolution
program “substantially and materially deviates from [its] minimum due process
standards.”79
3. Consumer Arbitration
In 1997, as controversy over the enforcement of pre-dispute mandatory arbitration clauses in consumer contracts mounted, the American Arbitration Association established a National Consumer Disputes Advisory Committee.80
The Committee formulated a Due Process Protocol for mediation and arbitration of consumer disputes, which is intended to provide guidance for resolving
a broad range of consumer disputes outside the court system.81 Like the Due
Process Protocol for Employment Arbitration that the AAA had endorsed, the
Due Process Protocol for consumer disputes restates the provisions of the FAA.
But, it also includes a recommended “notice of arbitration agreement” that
clearly indicates that a dispute under the relevant contract will not be subject to
court resolution.82 Ironically, the suggested notice goes way beyond the notice
proposed by the Montana state legislature that the U.S. Supreme Court struck
76

Id. at 5–7.
See, e.g., Cole v. Burns Int’l Sec. Servs., Inc., 105 F.3d 1465, 1488–91 (D.C. Cir. 1997);
HORNBERGER, supra note 75, at 8–11.
78
HORNBERGER, supra note 74, at 2; Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79
(2000).
79
AM. ARBITRATION ASSOC., EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION RULES AND MEDIATION
PROCEDURES 9 (2009) [hereinafter EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION], https://www.adr.org/aaa/Sh
owProperty?nodeld=/UCM /ADRSTG-o04362 [https://perma.cc/GSN3-PVWA].
80
AM. ARBITRATION ASSOC., CONSUMER DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL: STATEMENT OF
PRINCIPLES OF THE NATIONAL CONSUMER DISPUTES ADVISORY COMMITTEE 4 (1998) [hereinafter CONSUMER DUE PROCESS], https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/document_repository
/Consumer%20Due%20Process%20Protocol%20(1).pd [https://perma.cc/7LUA-N6HS].
81
Id. at 5.
82
Id. at 26–27.
77
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down in Doctor’s Associates.83 Whereas the principles incorporated in the due
process protocol for employment arbitration are described quite tersely, the
Consumer Due Process Protocol is discursive, and formatted quite similarly to
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, with each statement of a principle followed by extensive “Reporter’s Comments” that cite relevant academic literature and case law.84 For example, Principle 13, “Access to Information,” lays
out competing views of the trade-offs associated with incorporating discovery
in arbitration and includes discussion of issues such as privilege.85 Arguably,
under the AAA Due Process principles, a consumer arbitration of a high-value
complex dispute could take a very similar course as it would in litigation.
While federal and state rules of civil procedure are binding on civil disputants, AAA’s rules have no formal legal bite. However, in 2014, the AAA issued new supplementary rules for consumer arbitration requiring, inter alia,
that any company wishing AAA to administer its disputes with consumers, register its arbitration clause(s) with the AAA for its review and approval.86 If the
AAA decides that the clause deviates from its stated guidelines, it will ask the
business to either revise or delete the offending clause.87 Notably, the Consumer Due Process Protocol states “the arbitrator’s award should be final and binding, but subject to review in accordance with applicable statutes” and in the
Reporter’s comments recommends that a brief written explanation of the award
should be provided if requested by either party.88 In 2016, the AAA updated
their consumer arbitration rules setting a cap of $200 for filing fees charged to
the consumer-plaintiff, with all remaining expenses including arbitrators’ fees
to be paid by the company-defendant.89

83

Doctor’s Assoc. Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996). The AAA recommended notice
includes the following phrases:
You thus GIVE UP YOUR RIGHT TO GO TO COURT to assert or defend your rights under
this contract. . . . Your rights will be determined by a NEUTRAL ARBITRATOR and NOT a
judge or a jury. You are entitled to a FAIR HEARING, BUT the arbitration procedures are
SIMPLER AND MORE LIMITED THAN RULES APPLICABLE IN COURT. Arbitrator decisions are as enforceable as any court order and are subject to VERY LIMITED REVIEW BY A
COURT.

CONSUMER DUE PROCESS, supra note 80, at 27. The AAA recommends that the notice be
placed in a prominent “notice box” and be included in any online version. CAPS appear in
the original. Id.
84
See CONSUMER DUE PROCESS, supra note 80, at 9–10.
85
Id. at 29–31.
86
AM. ARBITRATION ASSOC., CONSUMER ARBITRATION RULES 16 (2014) [hereinafter
ARBITRATION RULES], https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/Consumer%20Rules.pdf [https:/
/perma.cc/GGA7-5T43].
87
Michael L. Mallow & Christine Reilly, New AAA Consumer Arbitrations Rules Go into
Effect September 1, LEXOLOGY (Aug. 25, 2014), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.a
spx?g=b69810c8-c5b9-488d-8c85-821222164768 [https://perma.cc/QNE9-9YWV].
88
See CONSUMER DUE PROCESS, supra note 80, at 30–31.
89
See ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 86, at 33.
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While arbitration providers have focused on procedural reform, other entities have responded to controversy over consumer arbitration by demanding
transparency about process and outcomes. In the wake of the revelation that
Kaiser Permanente’s mandatory arbitration program in practice systematically
disadvantaged its patient-subscribers,90 the health maintenance organization established a Blue Ribbon Panel to recommend reforms in its mandatory arbitration system.91 To assure that Kaiser’s arbitration system met its stated goals of
providing fair, efficient, and timely resolution of medical malpractice disputes
against its providers, the Panel recommended that the health maintenance organization appoint an independent monitor to regularly audit and report process
performance and outcomes.92 An outside lawyer who neither arbitrates disputes
nor represents parties in arbitration was appointed to implement this recommendation.93 The Independent Administrator issues annual reports on the program, including number of filings, mode of disposition, outcomes (including
settlement and monetary awards), and fees.94
In 2002, California lawmakers adopted legislation that requires all private
arbitration providers that offer consumer arbitration in California to publish information about their consumer arbitration cases, including: the nature of the
dispute, name of the non-consumer party, name of the arbitrators, the total fees
charged by the arbitrators, the mode of disposition, and the outcome.95 However, in contrast to Kaiser’s arbitration system, compliance with California’s statutory reporting requirements has been poor;96 a fact that is likely explained by
90

Engalla v. Kaiser Permanente Med. Grp., Inc., 938 P.2d 903, 918 (Cal. 1997) (holding
that a court may decline to compel arbitration when the arbitration process is infected with
fraud. The court found that as operated, Kaiser Permanente’s arbitration program was biased
against patient claimants). Kaiser Permanente is the largest health maintenance organization
in California, serving some 8 million families. In recent years, it has expanded its services to
other states. Fast Facts About Kaiser Permanente, KAISER PERMANENTE,
https://share.kaiserpermanente.org/article/fast-facts-about-kaiser-permanente/ [https://perma.
cc/GYG7-DZD5] (last visited Dec. 22, 2017).
91
EUGENE F. LYNCH ET AL., THE BLUE RIBBON ADVISORY PANEL ON KAISER PERMANENTE
ARBITRATION, THE KAISER PERMANENTE ARBITRATION SYSTEM: A REVIEW AND
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT 1 (1998), http://www.oia-kaiserarb.com/pdfs/BRPReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/6NA5-FNBW].
92
Id. at 28–30.
93
OFFICE OF THE INDEP. ADM’R, STATUS OF THE BLUE RIBBON PANEL RECOMMENDATIONS
(2017), http://www.oia-kaiserarb.com/pdfs/BRP-Status-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/2K733Q54].
94
OFFICE OF THE INDEP. ADM’R, ANNUAL REPORT (2016), http://www.oia-kaiserarb.com/pdf
s/2016-Annual-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/ND2X-7XFZ]. All of the annual reports since
the inception of the program are available on the Office of the Independent Administrator’s
website.
95
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.96 (West 2015) (originally enacted in 2002).
96
See DAVID J. JUNG ET AL., PUB. LAW RESEARCH INST., REPORTING CONSUMER
ARBITRATION DATA IN CALIFORNIA: AN ANALYSIS OF COMPLIANCE WITH CALIFORNIA CODE
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE § 1281.96 (2013), http://gov.uchastings.edu/docs/arbitration-report/201
4-arbitration-update [https://perma.cc/ZW6H-GCWJ].
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the absence in California of an office charged with enforcing these requirements.
D. Trends in Domestic Commercial Arbitration Generally
Traditional business-to-business arbitration, the “bread and butter” of
commercial arbitration providers, has not proved immune to the changes described above. Whether as a result of the evolution of arbitration in the securities, employment, and consumer spheres or for separate reasons, commercial
arbitration in the United States has also become more like litigation in recent
years.97 Extensive discovery, including substantial document production and
witness depositions, leading to longer proceedings and higher costs is said to
have become the norm, replacing the streamlined and less expensive approach
of the past.98 Much like judges, arbitrators often decide summary judgment motions and motions to compel or sanction.99 Some observers claim that appeals
of arbitration awards have also become more common.100 In response to changes such as these, in 2007, the construction industry—long a stalwart user of arbitration—deleted an arbitration clause from its standard form contract,101 leaving litigation as the default option. In place of arbitration, the industry
recommended alternatives viewed as more expeditious and less expensive, such
as structured negotiations, evaluative mediation, and non-binding mini-trials.102
Notwithstanding the similarities in trends among different domestic arbitration domains, two features distinguish business-to-business arbitration on the
one hand and securities, employment, and consumer arbitration on the other.
Business-to-business arbitration remains truly voluntary. Meanwhile, investors,
employees, and consumers are forced to sign contracts including pre-dispute
arbitration clauses as a condition of employment or transacting.103 And while
97

Thomas J. Stipanowich, ADR and the “Vanishing Trial”: The Growth and Impact of “Alternative Dispute Resolution,” 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 843, 895 (2004); Gerald F. Phillips, Is Creeping Legalism Infecting Arbitration?, 58 DISP. RESOL. J. 37, 38 (Feb. 2003–Apr.
2003).
98
W. Alexander Moseley, What Do You Mean I Can’t Get That? Discovery in Arbitration
Proceedings, CONSTR. LAW. 18, 24 (Fall 2006).
99
Thomas J. Stipanowich, Arbitration: The “New Litigation,” 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 11–12
(2010).
100
Katherine A. Helm, The Expanding Scope of Judicial Review or Arbitration Awards:
Where Does the Buck Stop?, 61 DISP. RESOL. J. 16, 25 (Nov. 2006–Jan. 2007) (arguing that
finality, one of the touted features of arbitration has been diminished as the grounds for appealing arbitrators’ decisions have expanded in recent years).
101
7 PHILIP L. BRUNER & PATRICK J. O’CONNOR, JR., BRUNER & O’CONNOR ON
CONSTRUCTION LAW § 21:3 (2014).
102
Id. § 21:3 & n.9. (citing John Hinchey & Laurence Schor, The Quest for the Right Questions in the Construction Industry, 57 DISP. RESOL. J. 8, 8 (Aug. 2002–Oct. 2002).
103
Exceptions to this general observation exist: Some business parties, such as franchisees,
may be forced to arbitrate disputes under the terms of franchise agreements and some highlevel employees in large corporations may be permitted to decide voluntarily whether to arbitrate or litigate disputes with employers. E-mail from Jean R. Sternlight, Dir., Saltman Ctr.
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many of the due process protocols that have been adopted for securities, employment, and consumer arbitration include transparency requirements, business-to-business arbitration remains strictly confidential.
II. RESPONDING TO PRIVATE NEEDS IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION
A.

From Early History to Institutionalization

While arbitration’s history in the United States goes back several hundred
years, the roots of arbitration outside the United States stretch back much further. Dispute resolution mechanisms comparable to modern-day arbitration
were popular in ancient China, Egypt, and India thousands of years before the
Christian era.104 Ancient Greek and Roman laws provided a framework for private parties to agree to arbitrate contractual disputes.105 In medieval Europe,
associations of merchants in different trades established arbitration tribunals to
resolve commercial disputes among their members.106 In England, the first act
that formalized arbitration by members of trade guilds dates back to 1698.107
Even after national courts were established and took jurisdiction over other
forms of civil disputes, domestic arbitration persisted, in some instances, alongside the courts and in others, in the form of specialized commercial courts.108
Eventually, arbitration became the dispute resolution mechanism of choice
for international traders as well as domestic business.109 Merchants who traded
across national borders—early global entrepreneurs—did not want to be hauled
into a local court outside their home territory; they also did not want their disputes to be decided by judges who lacked understanding of mercantile matfor Conflict Resolution, Saltman Professor, UNLV Boyd Sch. of Law, to author (July 20,
2017, 7:41 PM) (on file with author).
104
SIMON GREENBERG ET AL., INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: AN ASIA-PACIFIC
PERSPECTIVE 3–4 (2011) (noting that arbitration can be traced back to about 2100–1600 BC).
105
Id. at 4; see also DOUGLAS M. MACDOWELL, THE LAW IN CLASSICAL ATHENS 203–11
(1978).
106
Lynden Macassey, International Commercial Arbitration,—Its Origin, Development and
Importance, 24 A.B.A. J. 518 (1938). The paper was read before the Grotius Society of London in Gary’s Inn Hall, Apr. 26, 1938. Id.
107
LORD CROSS OF CHELSEA & G. J. HAND, RADCLIFFE AND CROSS: THE ENGLISH LEGAL
SYSTEM 250–51 (5th ed. 1971). However, using arbitration was not without criticism and
problems with enforceability. A leading decision by Lord Coke in 1609 allowed that a party
might revoke its agreement to arbitrate once a dispute arose although it would thereby forfeit
its performance bond. See Ernest Lorenzen, Commercial Arbitration- International and Interstate Aspects, 43 YALE L.J. 716, 716 (1934). Consistent with this decision the English Arbitration Act of 1698 allowed either party to withdraw its consent to arbitrate up until the
arbitral award was rendered. GREENBERG ET AL., supra note 104, at 5.
108
W. Laurence Craig, Some Trends and Developments in the Laws and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration, 50 TEX. INT’L L.J. 699, 704 (2016) (discussing development
of pie-powder courts in England and commercial courts in continental Europe with judges
that were elected by business communities).
109
RENÉ DAVID, ARBITRATION IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 14 (1985).
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ters.110 The response to both concerns was to establish private arbitration tribunals in which judges chosen by the parties applied specialized trans-national
customary law dubbed “lex mercatoria.”111 In 1883, the city council of London
asked a committee to draft a proposal to establish an arbitration tribunal for
domestic “and, in particular . . . trans-national commercial disputes” arising
within the city.112
International commercial arbitration responded to many of the same urges
that led businessmen to choose arbitration rather than courts for domestic disputes. The author of an article celebrating the 1892 inauguration of the London
commercial arbitration tribunal wrote,
This Chamber is to have all the virtues which the law lacks. It is to be expeditious where the law is slow, cheap where the law is costly, simple where the law
113
is technical, a peacemaker instead of a stirrer-up of strife.

The institutionalization of arbitration was also encouraged by the increased number of disputes following the Industrial Revolution, the resulting
increased economic specialization, and development of new trade and industry
associations.114
The public policy argument for international commercial arbitration was
similar to the argument in favor of domestic commercial arbitration: the
arbitrators were deciding private disputes between private parties and although
these disputes might have important consequences for the parties, they were
unlikely to have much public impact. But, there was an additional argument for
national governments to favor international commercial arbitration, which
came over time to be the most important argument of all: international trade
was regarded as the primary engine of national economic growth and domestic
welfare, and arbitration was regarded as essential to international trade.115 Early
110

Id.
Id. Contemporary lex mercatoria incorporates a web of “soft law” deriving from the
UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts, UNCITRAL conventions on
trade that bind signatory nations and harmonized national contract law. In practice, parties
specify what national law they intend to govern arbitration of their international commercial
disputes. See ALEC STONE SWEET & FLORIAN GRISEL, THE EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION: JUDICIALIZATION, GOVERNANCE, LEGITIMACY 35 (2017).
112
History, LCIA, http://www.lcia.org/LCIA/history.aspx [https://perma.cc/LR78-GC24]
(last visited Dec. 22, 2017) (the City of London Chamber of Arbitration was established in
1892, after the passage of the English arbitration statute that guaranteed enforcement of arbitration decisions. It was renamed the London Court of Arbitration in 1903 and subsequently
renamed the London Court of International Arbitration).
113
Edward Manson, The City of London Chamber of Arbitration, 9 LAW Q. REV. 86 (1893).
Manson also noted that businessmen wanted their disputes to be resolved by people in their
line of business, and according to their values, as had been true in England in the medieval
era. Id. See also History, supra note 112.
114
Craig, supra note 108, at 704.
115
Macassey, supra note 106, at 518.
111

“Present day schools of political philosophy may differ as to the ideal system of national organization: they may even contest the basis of international relationships. But on one point they are
all agreed. Every nation, whatever school of political ideology it may exemplify, is convinced
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recognition of these two principles—the importance of international trade and
the importance of international commercial arbitration to international trade—
was reflected in the inclusion of arbitration provisions in bilateral trade treaties
dating back to at least 1899.116 In 1919, a group of international entrepreneurs
who called themselves “the Merchants of Peace” established the International
Chamber of Commerce (ICC) in Paris, which, in 1923, created the International
Court of Arbitration to resolve disputes “of an international character.”117
How this belief in the criticality of arbitration to international trade developed is a long and somewhat complicated story. Arbitration had been endorsed
as the best vehicle for resolving disputes between nations at the Hague Peace
Conference in 1899, which established the Permanent Court of Arbitration in
the Hague.118 In the wake of World War I, establishing peaceful methods of resolving international trade disputes came to be seen as critical to preserving
global stability. The war had wreaked havoc on many nations, destroying, or
severely injuring their economic and social fabric. After World War I, the major European commercial nations adopted arbitration as the model for resolving
disputes between businesses engaged in trans-border trade. Over time, the idea
that a private scheme for resolving international business disputes, outside of
public view and without public input, was good for national welfare, became
that all foreign industrialists and merchants should be encouraged to import into their countries
as much of its raw materials and manufactured products as they can by any inducement be prevailed on to buy.”

More recently, then U.S. Secretary of State, John Kerry was quoted as articulating the same
view while praising the proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership at an appearance in Hawaii: “In
the 21st century, a nation’s interests and the wellbeing of its people are advanced not just by
troops or diplomats, but they’re advanced by entrepreneurs, by chief executives of companies, by the businesses that are good corporate citizens.” See ISDS: The Devil in the Trade
Deal,
ABC
RADIO
NAT’L
(Sept.
14,
2014,
8:05
AM),
http://www.abc.net.au/radionational/programs/backgroundbriefing/isds-the-devil-in-thetrade-deal/5734490 [https://perma.cc/L7D9-ALXY].
116
Macassey, supra note 106, at 522 (citing, inter alia, the Franco-Belgian Convention of
1899).
117
Id. at 523. The International Chamber of Commerce was one of a number of international
organizations that were established after World War I to promote international trade and the
peaceful resolution of disputes between nations and between private citizens of different nations.
The world had few working international structures in the immediate aftermath of the first of the
20th century’s global conflicts. There was no world system of rules to govern trade, investment,
finance or commercial relations. That the private sector should start filling the gap without waiting for governments was ground-breaking. It was an idea that took hold.

History: The Merchants of Peace, ICC ALB., http://icc-albania.org.al/history/ [https://perma
.cc/S74G-MSBN] (last visited Dec. 22, 2017); see also Who We Are: History, ICC,
https://iccwbo.org/about-us/who-we-are/history/ [https://perma.cc/ESZ4-CFH6] (last visited
Dec. 22, 2017).
118
History, PERMANENT COURT OF ARB., https://pca-cpa.org/en/about/introduction/history/
[https://perma.cc/PM8B-ZDK5] (last visited Dec. 22, 2017). Today, the Permanent Court of
Arbitration is a major forum for assisting businesses to resolve international disputes with
national governments and other state entities, either by administering arbitration procedures
or appointing arbitrators to “ad hoc” tribunals. Id.
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deeply embedded within international trade and economic policy. Economic
growth and trade in the aftermath of World War II further propelled
development of international commercial arbitration.119
B. Towards a Harmonized System of International Commercial Arbitration
Most international arbitral awards are satisfied voluntarily, without the
need for judicial enforcement.120 In fact, the ICC Arbitration Rules of 1923
provided that the parties were “honor bound” to comply with the arbitral
awards.121 However, as the international commercial community expanded and
arbitration became wide-spread, a more formal system for the enforcement of
arbitral awards was needed.122
Early attempts to create a system for recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards initiated by the ICC—the Geneva Protocol on Arbitration Clauses123 that helped ensure respect for arbitration clauses and the Geneva
Convention on the Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards124—had little support
outside of Europe.125 However, after World War II, these efforts came to fruition with the adoption of the New York Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards.126 The New York Convention, which
was ultimately ratified by more than 150 countries, requires the member states
both to recognize agreements to arbitrate and to recognize and enforce resulting

119

GREENBERG ET AL., supra note 104, at 9 (referencing to the establishment of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, one of the World Bank Group organizations, International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade).
120
Craig, supra note 108, at 705 (referencing, as an example, the fact that more than ninety
percent of ICC’s awards are satisfied voluntarily).
121
Id.
122
Id. at 706–07.
123
Protocol on Arbitration Clauses, Sept. 24, 1923, 27 L.N.T.S. 158 (1924).
124
See generally Convention for the Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards, Sept. 26, 1927,
92 L.N.T.S. 302 (1929).
125
The Geneva Protocol was ratified by twenty-four European states and only a few countries outside of Europe (Brazil, Japan, India, Israel, Iraq, Thailand, and New Zealand). For
the text of the Geneva Protocol and list of the ratifications, see History 1923–1958, N.Y.
ARB.
CONVENTION,
http://www.newyorkconvention.org/travaux+preparatoires/history+1923+-+1958
[https://perma.cc/TM4N-A85S] (last visited Dec. 22, 2017). The Geneva Convention was
open to any country that signed the Protocol but was ratified by fewer states, including only
two non-European states. See League of Nation Treaties, UNITED NATIONS TREATY
COLLECTION, https://treaties.un.org/pages/LONViewDetails.aspx?src=LON&id=548&chapte
r=30&clang=_en#2 [https://perma.cc/P24A-CGC7] (last visited Dec. 22, 2017).
126
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10,
1958, 330 U.N.T.S. 38. As of Dec. 20, 2017, there are 157 contracting states. See Status:
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, UNCITRAL,
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/NYConvention_status.html
[https://perma.cc/WSW6-BBEY] (last visited Dec. 20, 2017).

18 NEV. L.J. 381, HENSLER KHATAM - FINAL

404

NEVADA LAW JOURNAL

3/27/18 2:33 PM

[Vol. 18:381

arbitral awards.127 The United States ratified the New York Convention in
1970, and incorporated it into its national arbitration law, the FAA.128
Ratification of the New York Convention augmented the reputation and
popularity of international arbitration. Businesses engaged in global commerce
demanded protection against lawsuits brought in the courts of their foreign
counter-parties, where logically those parties might have an advantage. At the
same time, companies doing business across borders wanted to be confident
that once a dispute was resolved, the decision of the adjudicator would be enforceable in every country’s courts. As major commercial nations continued to
be unable to agree on a system of mutual recognition of each other’s court
judgments—a situation that prevails to this day—arbitration was the only
means to achieve this confidence.129
In 1966, amid the climate of expanding international trade, the General Assembly of the United Nations established the UN Commission on International
Trade Law (UNCITRAL)130—an organization that has since played a key role
in the development of international commercial arbitration. The UNCITRAL
Arbitration Rules, adopted in 1976, were incorporated in the procedural rules of
many private arbitral institutions. The rules cover all aspects of the arbitral process and contain a model arbitration clause that has been used in numerous ad
hoc international commercial arbitration proceedings.131
In 1985, to support the structure of international commercial arbitration
and to harmonize national arbitration laws UNCITRAL promulgated a Model

127

Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, supra note
126 art I.
128
9 U.S.C. § 201(1970).
129
Notwithstanding years of efforts, and apart from regional instruments, such as the Brussels regime in the European Union, there is still no international convention on the enforcement of court judgments. The 1971 Hague Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement
of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters is presently only ratified by Albania,
Cyprus, Netherlands and Portugal. See Status Table: Convention of 1 February 1971 on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters,
HCCH, https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/status-table/?cid=78
[https://perma.cc/T93Q-ADJV] (last updated Nov. 10, 2010). Notably, there is no bilateral or
multilateral treaty on enforcement of foreign judgments that includes the United States, arguably because other states are generally reluctant to enforce U.S. judgments involving multiple or punitive damages and object to the U.S. courts’ assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction. See U.S. Dep’t of State, Enforcement of Judgments, TRAVEL.ST.GOV., https://travel.sta
te.gov/content/travel/en/legal-considerations/judicial/enforcement-of-judgments.html [https:/
/perma.cc/M6HB-5ZM5] (last visited Dec. 4, 2017).
130
G.A. Res. 2205 (XXI), at 99 (Dec. 17, 1966).
131
See G.A. Res. 31/98, at 182 (Dec. 15, 1976); UNCITRAL, UNCITRAL RULES ON
TRANSPARENCY IN TREATY-BASED INVESTOR STATE ARBITRATION 31 (2014) [hereinafter
UNCITRAL RULES ON TRANSPARENCY], http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitratio
n/arb-rules-2013/UNCITRAL-Arbitration-Rules-2013-e.pdf [https://perma.cc/9YQN-BQQ
V]. UNCITRAL rules were amended in 2010 and again in 2013. G.A. Res. 65/22 (Dec. 6,
2010); G.A. Res. 68/109 (Dec. 16, 2013).
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Law on International Commercial Arbitration132 National legislation based on
the Model Law, often verbatim, has been adopted by seventy-five countries.133
The common characteristic of all these laws is that they impose a much looser
degree of control over international arbitration than pertains to purely domestic
arbitration within those countries.134 The Model Law allows parties to agree to
procedural and decisional rules that may not fully accord with a nation’s domestic law, arguably eliminating differences among domestic law that might
favor a disputant of one nationality over another,135 but perhaps also freeing
corporations engaged in international trade to avoid legal restrictions that they
view as unfavorable.
Today, multinational corporations have many arbitration organizations to
choose from, including traditional arbitration forums established almost a
hundred years ago, such as the ICC,136 the London Court of International
Arbitration (LCIA),137 the American Arbitration Association International
Center for Dispute Resolution (ICDR),138 as well as relatively younger regional
arbitration tribunals such as the Singapore International Arbitration Center
(SIAC),139 the Dubai International Arbitration Center (DIAC)140 and the Hong
132

G.A. Res. 40/72, at vii (Dec. 11, 1985); UNCITRAL, UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (2008), http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/text
s/arbitration/ml-arb/07-86998_Ebook.pdf [https://perma.cc/X3W6-VF83]. The Model Law
was amended in 2006. G.A. Res. 61/33, at viii (Dec. 4, 2006).
133
See Status: UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (1985),
with amendments as adopted in 2006, UNCITRAL, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncit
ral_texts/arbitration/1985Model_arbitration_status.html [https://perma.cc/N7D6-AE5T] (last
visited Dec. 22, 2017). Counting provincial as well as national governments, a total of 106
jurisdictions have adopted the Model Law. Id.
134
Craig, supra note 108, at 727 (the rationale for the difference is that states arguably have
a stronger interest in the disposition of disputes that arise within their borders and involve
exclusively domestic actors; also, they may have a greater ability to impose their will on
domestic actors).
135
See Id. at 756 (In particular, nations with developing economies have been perceived to
be biased against more developed nations).
136
ICC was founded in 1919 and its International Court of Arbitration was created in 1923.
Who We Are: History, supra note 117.
137
The LCIA was formally inaugurated in 1892. See History, supra note 112. The Law
Quarterly Review wrote about the inauguration: “This Chamber is to have all the virtues
which the law lacks. It is to be expeditious where the law is slow, cheap where the law is
costly, simple where the law is technical, a peacemaker instead of a stirrer-up of strife.”
Manson, supra note 113, at 86.
138
The AAA was founded in 1926, but the ICDR was established in 1996. See About the
American Arbitration Association (AAA) and the International Centre for Dispute Resolution
(ICDR), INT’L CTR. FOR DISP. RESOL., https://www.icdr.org (follow “about” hyperlink)
[https://perma.cc/S8MR-JPKR] (last visited Dec. 22, 2017); AAA Mission and Principles,
AM. ARB. ASS’N, https://www.adr.org/MissionPrinciples [https://perma.cc/XF6J-ZSST] (last
visited Dec. 22, 2017).
139
Established in 1991. About Us, SIAC, http://www.siac.org.sg/2014-11-03-13-3343/about-us [https://perma.cc/FPQ6-79TK] (last visited Dec. 22, 2017).
140
Established in 1994. About DIAC, DUBAI INT’L ARB. CTR., http://www.diac.ae/idias/abou
tus/ [https://perma.cc/W585-89TF] (last visited Dec. 22, 2017).
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Kong International Arbitration Center (HKIAC).141 The number of international arbitration institutions has increased dramatically,142 and their respective
caseloads continue to increase significantly.143 In 2015, the total value of pending claims at just one tribunal, the ICC, was said to be more than $286 billion.144 National governments in developing economies have supported the
establishment of new arbitration centers not just because they are perceived to
create a favorable aura for international investment, but because arbitration
generates revenue for its national seat, in the form of payments for real estate,
ancillary services (e.g. for legal assistance, information technology, etc.),
lodging, food, transportation, and other needs.145 Arbitrators compete with each
other for appointments and key positions within arbitration institutions.146 In
short, international commercial arbitration not only supports international
commerce, it has become a business in itself.
C. From Streamlined Dispute Resolution to Formal Adjudication
Were the celebrant of the 1892 inauguration of the London Chamber of
Arbitration—the predecessor of the London Court of International Arbitration—to observe its proceedings and those of its sister organizations in other
parts of the world today, by all reports he would be deeply disappointed. Where
141

“[E]stablished in 1985 by a group of leading businesspeople and professionals in an effort to meet the growing need for dispute resolution services in Asia.” At A Glance: About
HKIAC, HKIAC, http://www.hkiac.org/about-us [https://perma.cc/WE7F-UC3Z] (last visited Dec. 22, 2017).
142
The American Bar Association lists eleven international arbitration institutions on its
website. See Arbitration Resources, AM. BAR ASS’N, http://apps.americanbar.org/dch/com
add.cfm?com=IC730000&pg=1 [https://perma.cc/U7M6-HYB2] (last visited Dec. 22, 2017).
143
See, e.g., Reports, LIAC, http://www.lcia.org/LCIA/reports.aspx [https://perma.cc/2KZM
-BLEK] (last visited Dec. 22, 2017) (reports dated 2000–2016 show a consistent increase in
the cases referred each year); see also Markus Altenkirch & Nicolas Gremminger, Parties’
Preferences in International Arbitration: The Latest Statistics of the Leading Arbitral Institutions, GLOBAL ARB. NEWS (Aug. 5, 2015), https://globalarbitrationnews.com/parties-pref
erences-in-international-arbitration-the-latest-statistics-of-the-leading-arbitral-institutions20150805/ [https://perma.cc/8M4P-FLG] (Among top five international tribunals with the
highest annual number of new cases are China International Economic and Trade Arbitration
Commission (CIETAC), AAA ICDR, ICC, LCIA and HKIAC); Caroline Simson, ICC Stats
Show Record Number of Arbitrations in 2016, LAW360 (Jan. 18, 2017, 7:09 PM),
https://www.law360.com/articles/881958/icc-stats-show-record-number-of-arbitrations-in-2
016 [https://perma.cc/W4CV-5HWE].
144
SWEET & GRISEL, supra note 111, at 45 n.38.
145
On the notion that arbitration generates revenue, see, for example, Cedric C. Chao &
Steven L. Smith, Becoming a Global Center for Arbitration, L.A. DAILY J. (Sept. 20, 2013),
http://files.dlapiper.com/files/Uploads/Documents/DLA-Piper-9-20-13-Daily-Journal.pdf.
[https://perma.cc/5ZP2-D956] (arguing the California should take steps to make it a more
attractive venue for international arbitration and referring to an estimate that a ten to twenty
percent increase in arbitration in New York would generate an increase of $200–$400 million in revenues for that city).
146
SWEET & GRISEL, supra note 111, at 72.
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arbitration was to be “expeditious where the law is slow, cheap where the law
is costly, [and] simple where the law is technical,”147 international commercial
arbitration is widely perceived to have become time-consuming, expensive, and
procedurally rigid.148 Hearings are lengthy and frequently feature live testimony. Document production may be extensive. Although parties draft their arbitration clauses once they have chosen an arbitration tribunal, that tribunal imposes its own procedural rules, which may be quite “technical.” For example,
the ICC, which until recently had the largest caseload of international arbitration institutions, incorporates a mandatory review of arbitration awards by a
panel of arbitration lawyers and ICC staff in its arbitral procedures.149 In short,
arbitration looks a lot like litigation and adjudication in the United States,150
albeit with private judges in private settings delivering confidential awards.151
Objective empirical evidence to support the perception of increasing “judicialization” of international commercial arbitration152 is lacking, in large part
because arbitration institutions—although they report numbers of cases filed
and sometimes information about awards—report little about procedures in
147

Manson, supra note 113, at 86 (describing the “virtues” of the London Chamber of Arbitration that later became the London Court of International Arbitration).
148
Giorgio Bernini, The Future of Arbitration: Flexibility or Rigidity? in ARBITRATION
INSIGHTS: TWENTY YEARS OF THE ANNUAL LECTURE OF THE SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION 48 (Julian D.M. Lew & Loukas A. Mistelis eds., 2007); see also Jean-Claude
Najar, Inside Out: A User’s Perspective on Challenges in International Arbitration, 25 ARB.
INT’L 515, 515 (2009) (arguing that “[a]rbitration has evolved into a process as costly and as
time-consuming as traditional litigation.”).
149
SWEET & GRISEL, supra note 111, at 101–07.
150
See Elena V. Helmer, International Commercial Arbitration: Americanized, “Civilized,”
or Harmonized? 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 35, 36 (2003).
151
In response to criticism of the growing inefficiency and expense of arbitration proceedings, many providers have created “expedited procedures” that attempt to return to the
streamlined model of the past, at least for smaller value claims. Instead of panels of three
arbitrators, cases may be heard and decided by a sole arbitrator, and there are strict time limits for issuing procedural orders and awards. Discovery is strongly discouraged. Disputes are
to be decided on written submissions. Where immediate relief is sought, a temporary arbitrator may be appointed before the formal constitution of a panel. Some providers apply expedited rules automatically to smaller claims, but parties with larger claims are free to agree to
proceed in an expedited fashion. See Peter Morton, Can a World Exist Where Expedited Arbitration Becomes the Default Procedure?, 26 ARB. INT’L 103, 103–04 (2010). For examples
of expedited procedures, see, generally, INT’L CTR. FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION, INT’L DISP.
RESOL. PROC.’S. 7 (2014), https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/ICDR%20Rules_0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/CD2N-TSTK]; Arbitration Rules, ICC, at art. 30 (Mar. 30, 2017),
https://iccwbo.org/dispute-resolution-services/arbitration/rules-of-arbitration/#article_30new
[https://perma.cc/HNW3-HXV3] (expedited procedures). Notably, in the international commercial arbitration context “small claims” are denoted in hundreds of thousands or millions
of dollars. For example, the ICDR expedited procedures apply to disputes where no claim
exceeds $250,000. INT’L CTR. FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra note 151, at 7. The ICC expedited procedure apply to disputes where claims do not exceed $250,000, exclusive of interest and the costs of arbitration. Arbitration Rules, supra note 151, at art. 1.
152
Gerbay, supra note 1, at 224 & n.4 (citing surveys of users reporting dissatisfaction with
the cost and duration of international arbitration).

18 NEV. L.J. 381, HENSLER KHATAM - FINAL

408

NEVADA LAW JOURNAL

3/27/18 2:33 PM

[Vol. 18:381

practice. Using indirect measures of complexification of rules and contention
between arbitral parties, Gerbay found little evidence of such a shift over the
last two decades.153 What has changed is the complexity of trans-national trade
disputes and the amounts of money at stake in arbitration: garden variety
“trad[e] disputes” account for a smaller fraction of international arbitration
caseloads, having been replaced by intellectual property disputes, disputes arising out of mergers and acquisitions, and disputes associated with regulated industries, such as oil, electric power, and telecommunications. A larger fraction
of disputes involves more than two parties and multiple contracts.154 In sum, if
international commercial arbitration is no longer the informal streamlined process that was once envisaged, it likely is because international commercial disputes are no longer the relatively simple disputes that process was designed to
resolve. Moreover, contemporary disputes are more likely to involve public
policies that are implicit in copyright and patent law and associated with regulated industries.
The fact that international commercial arbitration processes have mutated
in response to changes in the character of disputes is not in itself surprising.
What is more notable—particularly in an age that celebrates informal and conciliatory forms of dispute resolution, such as mediation—is that the direction of
change has been towards adjudicative models. Two signs of a preference for
formal adjudication have been the requirement to publish reasoned awards155
and the move to publish awards, albeit in redacted form (i.e. omitting names of
arbitrators, parties, and key facts that might identify disputants), and only if the
parties agree156 or in circumscribed circumstances.157 While requirements for
reasoned awards have been justified as a means of enhancing the probability of
enforceability, the publication of awards facilitates the development of a commercial arbitration jurisprudence, wherein arbitrators can look to awards in
previously decided similar cases as precedents.158 A jurisprudence promulgated
by private individuals selected by private corporations and under no obligation
to follow national laws and judicial decisions may concern independent observers, but it may give comfort to parties seeking predictable outcomes in a system
where appellate rights are limited.
153

Id. at 236–38. It is possible of course that change set in more than two decades ago.
Id. at 240–44.
155
SWEET & GRISEL, supra note 111, at 101–02.
156
INT’L CTR. FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION, supra note 151, at 28. (redacted awards will be
published unless parties agree otherwise).
157
London Court of Arbitration rules, requiring publication of awards when arbitrators are
challenged. See Thomas W. Walsh & Ruth Teitelbaum, The LCIA Court Decisions on Challenges to Arbitrators: An Introduction, 27 ARB. INT’L 283, 283 (2011).
158
Arbitration rules have also been amended to strengthen disclosure requirements for arbitrators. Some commentators have suggested that this is a product of the entry of new arbitral
institutions (without a track record) into the market and new arbitration customers with less
knowledge of the clubby world of elite arbitrators. See Catherine A. Rogers, Transparency in
International Commercial Arbitration, 54 KAN. L. REV. 1301, 1314–17, 1319–20 (2006).
154
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III. PROTECTING PUBLIC INTEREST IN INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION
A. The Emergence of Investment Arbitration
As international trade expanded, sometimes even the traditional international commercial arbitration regime was not enough to create the kind of confidence in dispute resolution that businesses demand. When an American multinational corporation does business in Germany, it faces a real choice between
litigation in court and arbitration. However, large multi-national corporations
do not operate solely in countries that adhere to the “rule of law.” Many of the
most lucrative business opportunities in the world involve investment in countries without independent judiciaries and countries that are politically unstable.
Many of these countries are anxious to attract foreign direct investment, to extract oil, gas, and other valuable resources, develop national electric power
grids, or create modern telecommunication systems, but do not have a welldeveloped “rule of law.”
After World War II, U.S., British, and Western European corporations suffered substantial losses when the leaders of newly independent and developing
nations in Africa and Latin America abruptly canceled projects, seized foreignowned properties, and nationalized enterprises built with foreign money.159
Traditional international commercial arbitration had been designed for business-to-business trade disputes, not for the disputes between corporations and
national governments that followed. Not having a reliable dispute resolution
mechanism to obtain compensation when investments were hijacked by national governments discouraged corporate investment in countries with developing
economies.160
Eventually, new leaders who were more favorable towards foreign investors emerged in these countries. Together, rich and poor countries looked for a
way of both attracting investment to countries that needed it and guaranteeing
that corporations in rich countries would be willing to make such investments.
Bilateral investment treaties (BITs) between—on the one hand—wealthy nations that were home to corporations looking for places to invest their money
and—on the other hand—poorer nations that wanted that money to build their
economies, emerged as the means of creating a more certain financial climate.161 BITS were (and still are) intended to protect foreign corporations from
unfair actions by the government of the country they have invested in, particu159

See Kenneth J. Vandevelde, A Brief History of International Investment Agreements, 12
U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 157, 167 (2005).
160
The developing and socialist countries using their numeric majority at the U.N. General
Assembly adopted an international framework that allowed for expropriation without compensation. See G.A. Res. 3201(S–VI), Declaration on the Establishment of a New Economic
Order, ¶ 3(e) (May 1, 1974).
161
During the post-World War II period, multi-lateral treaties became the favored instruments for regulating trade among nations. But, by design, these treaties excluded transnational investments. Vandevelde, supra note 159 at 162, 170.
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larly expropriation of the investors’ property.162 The first BITs were negotiated
in the 1950s, but the use of bilateral treaties to govern foreign investment did
not take off until the 1990s.163 By 2015, about 3000 BITs had been negotiated
by 180 countries.164
Lack of effective avenues to pursue compensation under international law
beyond espousal (i.e. when a national government prosecutes a claim on behalf
of its national) posed a special problem for foreign investors, as national governments typically do not allow a private party (much less a foreign private party) to sue them for their discretionary decisions and investors’ own governments were often unwilling to sue another nation. Consequently, in 1966, the
World Bank established a new dispute resolution system—the International
Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID)—to permit foreign
investors to bring claims against host governments if a government took adverse actions against the investors’ interests.165 ICSID was established under
the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and
Nationals of Other States (“ICSID Convention”) with the hope that it would facilitate the settlement of investment disputes between governments and foreign
investors and promote investment in development projects.166 Most of the 3000
or so BITs negotiated to date contain a dispute resolution clause that refers any
disputes that arise between a private investor from one of the countries and the
government of the other country to either the ICSID167 or to an “ad hoc” private
arbitration process operating under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.168
162

The United States’ goal in negotiating and promoting bilateral investment treaties has
been to guarantee “prompt, adequate and effective” compensation in the event of expropriation of U.S. corporate investors’ properties in foreign countries. See Id. at 171.
163
Id. at 157–58, 169.
164
See Database of Bilateral Investment Treaties, ICSID, https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/
Pages/resources/Bilateral-Investment-Treaties-Database.aspx [https://perma.cc/YW7C-UD
LA] (last visited Dec. 5, 2017).
165
See About ICSID, INT’L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT INV. DISP., https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/
Pages/about/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/3JVX-HYNR] (last visited Dec. 22, 2017). Generally, ICSID rules can only be applied to disputes arising out of “investments” as defined in
the ICSID rules. Resorting to a forum for resolving investor-state disputes does not preclude
pursuing the same underlying dispute in a WTO forum or under the provisions of a Regional
Trade Agreement. See also Sergio Puig, The Merging of International Trade and Investment
Law, 33 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 1, 4–5 (2015).
166
Andrew P. Tuck, Investor-State Arbitration Revised: A Critical Analysis of the Revisions
and Proposed Reforms to the ICSID and UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, 13 LAW & BUS. REV.
AM. 885, 889 (2007).
167
Id. at 886.
168
See UNCITRAL RULES ON TRANSPARENCY, supra note 131, at 31. Whereas the ICSID
Convention was adopted specifically to apply to investor-state disputes, UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules were originally adopted to apply to international commercial arbitration generally, and only later came to be applied to investor-state disputes as well. See Norbert Horn,
UNCITRAL Transparency Rules 2013 for Investment Arbitration, in A REVOLUTION IN THE
INTERNATIONAL RULES OF LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF DON WALLACE, JR. 332–34 (Borzu Sabahi et al. eds., 2014); see also Ian A. Laird, Transparency in Investor-State Arbitration, in
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The ICSID dispute resolution system applies “to any legal dispute arising
directly out of an investment, between a Contracting State . . . and a national of
another Contracting State.”169 As of the date of this paper, there are 161 “contracting states.”170 Six countries have signed but have not ratified the ICSID
Convention, and three former members (Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela)
withdrew in 2007, 2009, and 2012.171 Among countries with large economies,
Brazil, Mexico, India, and South Africa have never been ICSID members.172
The United States has been a member of the ICSID Convention since its inception.173 Most of the approximately 650 investor-state arbitrations that had taken
place through 2013 were conducted either by ICSID or under UNCITRAL
rules.174
B. The Judicialization of Investor-State Arbitration
Originally, the rules for investor-state arbitration were similar to those of
ordinary international and domestic commercial arbitration. The arbitrators
(usually three) were selected by the disputing parties from a list provided by the
organization administering the process (e.g. the World Bank’s Centre), the arbitrators’ fees were paid by the parties, oral proceedings took place behind closed
doors with limited disclosure of documents (i.e. discovery), and arbitrators’
awards were confidential and therefore had no precedential authority. And then
something curious happened—at least when viewed from a historical perspective: from a private procedure along the lines of traditional domestic and international commercial arbitration, investor-state arbitration began to morph into a
semi-public process.

A REVOLUTION IN THE INTERNATIONAL RULES OF LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF DON WALLACE,
JR., supra note 168, at 352.
169
INT’L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISPUTES, CONVENTION ON THE SETTLEMENT OF
INVESTMENT DISPUTES BETWEEN STATES AND NATIONALS OF OTHER STATES 18 (2009)
(2006), https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/icsiddocs/ICSID%20Convention%20Engl
ish.pdf [https://perma.cc/RG3J-7DW6].
170
Database of ICSID Member States, ICSID, https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/about/D
atabase-of-Member-States.aspx [https://perma.cc/JN47-N45M] (last visited Dec. 22, 2017).
171
See, e.g., id.; see also Nicolas Boeglin, ICSID and Latin America: Criticism, Withdrawals and Regional Alternatives, BILATERALS.ORG (June 25, 2013), http://www.bilaterals.org/?i
csid-and-latin-america-criticisms#nh9 [https://perma.cc/BJ3F-J2TA].
172
See Database of ICSID Member States, supra note 170.
173
See, e.g., id.
174
Through 2013, 450 investor-state arbitrations had been held in the ICSID forum and 158
under UNCITRAL rules; less than one-hundred had been concluded in other forums or under
other rules. See Matthew Coleman et al., Choosing an Arbitral Forum for Investor-State Arbitration, STEPTOE (Jan. 27, 2015), http://www.steptoe.com/publications-10156.html [https://
perma.cc/9EWP-LJUP]. Other arbitral tribunals commonly referenced in BITs are: the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce and the ICC. Id.
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In 2006, the ICSID amended its rules to include provisions related to
“transparency.”175 If there is no objection by a party, representatives of the public may attend the oral hearings, neutral third-parties may submit statements for
the arbitrators to consider (i.e. as amici curiae), and arbitrators’ awards may be
published.176 Four years later, in 2010, UNCITRAL—the other major provider
of investor-state arbitration rules—adopted similar rules entitled Transparency
in Treaty-Based Investor-State Arbitration (“the Transparency Rules”).177 The
Transparency Rules were slightly revised in 2013, and became effective on
April 1, 2014, for treaties negotiated thereafter.178 Most documents relevant to
an arbitration conducted under UNCITRAL rules must be made public, oral
hearings must be open to the public, and the arbitrators’ awards must be
published.179 The UNCITRAL Transparency Rules apply automatically to all
investor-state arbitrations conducted under all treaties negotiated or renegotiated after April 2014, with dispute resolution clauses referencing UNCITRAL
Arbitration Rules, unless the parties explicitly excluded future disputes under
these treaties from the transparency requirements.180 In contrast, under ICSID
rules there is a presumption in favor of keeping outcomes confidential but parties may agree to waive this in favor of public access.181
In addition, in 2014, UNCITRAL promulgated the United Nations Convention on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration (“the Mauritius
Convention on Transparency”), which applies the UNCITRAL transparency

175

See Ignacio Torterola, The Transparency Requirement in the New UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules: A Premonitory View, INV. TREATY NEWS (Sep. 23, 2010),
www.iisd.org/itn/2010/09/23/the-transparency-requirement-in-the-new-uncitral-arbitrationrules-a-premonitory-view/.
176
See Id. ICSID Rule 32 (open hearings); Rule 37(2) on amicus curiae; Rule 48 (publication of arbitration awards). The ICSID transparency rules were first applied in 2007.
177
See UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor State Arbitration,
UNCITRAL, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/2014Transparenc
y.html [https://perma.cc/35HF-VQ6C] (last visited Dec. 22, 2017).
178
Id.
179
The 2014 adoption of the new UNCITRAL transparency rules followed years of debate
and controversy. A prime argument in favor of transparency was that, in many countries,
proceedings involving the national government were by law open to the public. Also, special
international tribunals established to resolve certain disputes, such as the Iran-US Claims
Tribunal, operated in a transparent fashion. See, e.g., Torterola, supra note 175. Torterola
notes that historically some 19th century arbitration tribunals, as well as the International
Court of Justice and its predecessor, the Permanent Court of International Justice, provided
for public access when arbitrators were deciding matters related to states acting within their
sovereign powers. Id.
180
In effect, only the states that negotiate the treaties, not a corporate investor bringing a
claim against the state under the dispute resolution clause, may set aside the transparency
requirements. Id.
181
According to Adam Raviv, a majority of ICSID decisions are published. Adam Raviv,
Achieving a Faster ICSID, in 4 RESHAPING THE INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
SYSTEM: JOURNEYS FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 657 n.10 (Jean Kalicki & Anna Joubin-Bret eds.,
2015).
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rules to treaties negotiated before April 2014.182 As of October 2017, the Convention had been signed by twenty-two countries, including the United States,
but has entered into force for Switzerland, Canada, and Mauritius .183 The European Commission is providing financial support to the Registry established
by the Convention to publish awards.184
A number of arguments have been put forth for increased transparency in
investment arbitration. As the number of disputes between investors and national governments multiplied, representatives of some nations began to argue
that because the defendants were national governments, national laws requiring
open access to court proceedings and trial outcomes applied.185 Additionally,
many investor-state disputes concern foreign investments in public services,
development of natural resources and public utilities—sectors in which the
public has a strong interest and which may affect significantly the host country’s economy.186 Thirdly, it is not uncommon that investor-state disputes involve allegations of corruption and bribery by governmental officials—an area
that is appropriately of great public concern.187
Arguments favoring transparency gained force when some countries were
told by investment arbitration tribunals that they had to pay large sums of taxpayers’ money to compensate private corporations for violations of investment
agreements.188 To some citizens of these countries, the fact that the decisions
were being made by private arbitrators, including privately-paid arbitrators se182

See UNCTAD, IIA ISSUES NOTE: TAKING STOCK OF IIA REFORM 1, 11 (2016) [hereinafter
IIA ISSUES NOTE], http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Publications/Details/142 [https://pe
rma.cc/RR83-K6FX] (the Convention has not yet entered into force).
183
See Status: United Nations Convention on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State
Arbitration, UNCITRAL, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/2014
Transparency_Convention_status.html [https://perma.cc/E4M4-898V] (last visited Sept. 13,
2017).
184
See European Commission to Continue its Support of the Operation of UNCITRAL
Transparency Registry for a Further Three Years, UNIS (Dec. 14, 2016), http://www.unis.un
vienna.org/unis/en/pressrels/2016/unisl240.html [https://perma.cc/Y7ZM-499E].
185
Torterola, supra note 175.
186
See, e.g., MEG KINNEAR, INT’L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISP., 2016 ANNUAL
REPORT 34 (2016), https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/resources/ICSID_AR16_Engli
sh_CRA_bl2_lhh,spreads.pdf [https://perma.cc/N7T6-MUGK] (showing that thirty-five percent of cases involved electric power and other energy, twenty percent of cases involved oil
and gas concessions, and the remaining cases included telecommunication; transportation,
construction; agriculture, fishing and forestry, etc.).
187
James D. Fry & Odysseas G. Repousis, Towards a New World for Investor-State Arbitration Through Transparency, 48 N.Y.U. J. INT’L. L. & POL. 795, 805 (2016) (citing World Duty Free Company Limited v. The Republic of Kenya, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/7, Oct. 4,
2006, Award, ¶¶ 129, 167–88 (involving a bribe paid to the Kenyan President)).
188
Id. at 805–06. For example, in 2012, an ICSID arbitration panel ordered Ecuador to pay
Occidental Petroleum $2.3 billion in a dispute over expropriation of oil drilling rights. Jonathan Weisman, Trans-Pacific Partnership Seen as Door for Foreign Suits Against U.S., N.
Y. TIMES, (Mar. 25, 2015) https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/26/business/trans-pacificpartnership-seen-as-door-for-foreign-suits-against-us.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/96XB-NM
H3].
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lected by the plaintiff-corporation, raised concerns about bias towards corporate
parties, and made the decisions illegitimate, even though under investor-state
arbitration rules the country itself had also selected one of the arbitrators.189
The fact that the proceedings took place behind closed doors did not help to
dispel these perceptions of illegitimacy.190
Unease with investor-state arbitration grew when multinational corporations adopted a new strategy of using the procedure to challenge legislative
mandates that were intended to improve public health and safety or protect the
environment. Perhaps the most notorious of these corporate efforts was Philip
Morris International’s challenge to Australia’s “plain packaging” tobacco legislation.191 After Australia’s parliament enacted a law prohibiting tobacco companies from decorating cigarette packages with their company’s logo, Philip
Morris, along with other tobacco companies challenged the law, claiming that it
deprived the company of the value of their trademark.192 The companies took
the case all the way up to Australia’s High Court, where they suffered a resounding defeat.193 But that did not end the tobacco companies’ attack on Australia’s legislation. Taking advantage of a previously negotiated BIT between
Hong Kong and Australia, Philip Morris’s Hong Kong subsidiary brought an
arbitration claim against Australia arguing, essentially, that Australia’s plain
packaging regulations constituted an “expropriation” under the treaty.194 Although investor-state arbitration is usually invoked by corporations to obtain
189

Typically, in arbitration, each party chooses an arbitrator who is supposed to be neutral,
but nonetheless is presumed to have that party’s interest in mind, and then the two partyselected arbitrators choose a third arbitrator to chair the panel (and break any tie between the
party-selected arbitrators). See, e.g., UNCITRAL RULES ON TRANSPARENCY, supra note 131,
at 11 (referencing Article 9).
190
Fry & Repousis, supra note 187, at 806–07.
191
The original challenge to Australia’s statute was brought by British Tobacco and JT International. See Philip Morris Asia Ltd. (Hong Kong) v. Australia (Tobacco Plain Packaging
Case), PCA Case Repository No. 2012-12, Award, at 1–3 (Dec. 17, 2015), https://www.pcac
ases.com/web/sendAttach/1711 [https://perma.cc/DQ6K-C92U]. Philip Morris was an intervening party in support of BT. See British Am. Tobacco Australasia Ltd. v. Commonwealth
[2012] HCA 43 (Austl.); JT Int’l SA v. Commonwealth [2012] HCA 43 (Austl.).
192
Tobacco Plain Packaging Case, ¶¶ 6–7.
193
For the separate opinions and conclusions reached by each High Court’s Justice, see British Am. Tobacco Australasia Ltd., ¶ 45; JT Int’l SA, ¶¶ 159–60, 189–91, 242–43, 306–07,
373–74.
194
See Tobacco Plain Packaging Case. There were several unusual aspects of Philip Morris’
action. First, it filed its ICSID claim in anticipation of the Australian legislation (which Philip Morris had lobbied against unsuccessfully). Second, it asked for an injunction against the
legislation, whereas the normal remedy in investor-state arbitration is compensation. Moreover, Australia argued that Philip Morris Asia (the Hong Kong subsidiary) had purchased an
interest in Philip Morris Australia only shortly before the passage of the legislation, and for
the purpose of being able to bring a claim in investor-state arbitration. See also Puig, supra
note 165, at 34–35. Australia’s investment treaty with Hong Kong was one of only twentyeight treaties Australia had ratified with ISDS provisions. The TPP would have been the first
agreement between Australia and the United States with an ISDS provision. ISDS: The Devil
in the Trade Deal, supra note 115.
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monetary compensation for an alleged violation of an investment agreement,
Philip Morris requested that the arbitrators enjoin Australia from implementing
its regulations, in essence asking the private arbitrators to put themselves in the
position of Australia’s high court justices. Ultimately, Australia prevailed in the
arbitration when the arbitrators ruled that they did not have jurisdiction over
Philip Morris’s claim because it did not come within the treaty language on
what constituted an expropriation.195 Australia later announced that it would
not include investor-state arbitration clauses in its future treaties.196
Although Philip Morris’s attempt to use investor-state arbitration to
preempt anti-smoking regulations attracted the widest attention, Philip Morris
is not the only corporation to attempt to leverage investor-state arbitration
against national substantive law. Corporations have brought investor-state arbitration claims against the United States and Canada seeking relief from stricter
environmental regulation, against Germany for deciding to phase out nuclear
power plants in the wake of the nuclear reactor disaster in Fukushima, against
Canada challenging a Canadian (trial) court’s interpretation of the scope of patent protection for a pharmaceutical product (upheld by that country’s federal
Court of Appeals), and against Guatemala for setting electric utility customers’
fees lower than the corporation had anticipated at the time of its investment.197
195

Kavaljit Singh, ISDS Arbitration Upholds Australia’s Plain Packaging Laws, E. ASIA F.
(Jan. 15, 2016), http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2016/01/15/isds-arbitration-upholds-australias
-plain-packaging-laws/ [https://perma.cc/93MS-NSPD].
196
Puig, supra note 165, at 35. See Leon E Trakman, Choosing Domestic Courts Over Investor-State Arbitration: Australia’s Repudiation of the Status Quo, 35 U. N.S.W. L.J. 979,
985–87 (2012). A similar attempt by Philip Morris to use investor-state arbitration to
preempt Uruguay’s anti-smoking regulation also failed. However, critics of investor-state
arbitration pointed out that Philip Morris’ aggressive use of arbitration to contest antismoking regulation imposed hefty legal costs on the countries it claimed against, and had the
potential (perhaps intentional) to chill anti-smoking regulation, particularly by smaller and
less wealthy countries that would not have the resources of an Australia to defend their legislative mandates. Perhaps in response to growing opposition to Philip Morris’s strategy, the
US Trade Representative proposed in 2014 that the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement
(TPP)—a treaty that President Trump recently set aside, as discussed infra—have a so-called
“carve out” for anti-smoking regulation. The tobacco industry was joined by other industry
representatives in lobbying fiercely against this idea, suggesting that at least some corporate
lobbyists were looking forward to the possibility of using investor-state arbitration as a
shield against product safety regulation. Puig, supra note 165, at 35 n.168 (citing Michael
Bloomberg, Op-Ed: Why is Obama Caving on Tobacco? N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 22, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/23/opinion/why-is-obama-caving-on-tobacco.html).
197
JOHNSON ET AL., supra note 14, at 2–3. Johnson’s co-author, Prof. Jeffrey Sachs, is a noted American economist and expert on international development. See James Billingsley, Eli
Lilly and Company v. The Government of Canada and the Perils of Investor-State Arbitration, APPEAL, 2015, at 27 (discussing investor-state arbitration claims against Canadian
courts’ interpretation of patent protection for pharmaceutical products); see also Caroline
Simson, Teco Brings Electricity Row with Guatemala to D.C. Court, LAW360 (Jan. 17, 2017,
5:01 PM), https://www.l aw360.com/articles/881490/teco-brings-electricity-row-withguatemala-to-dc-court [https://p
erma.cc/YK3G-MFXV] (reporting on investor-state arbitration claims against Guatemala’s
electricity pricing decision).
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Some of these corporations prevailed in arbitration, and some did not.198 When
corporations prevailed, they asked courts to confirm the arbitrators’ award, just
as would happen if a business won an award against another business in a domestic arbitration case. In other words, while private arbitrators made the decisions that determined the outcomes of these claims, publicly-appointed judges
were brought into play to enforce the decisions (whether or not the judges
might have made those decisions themselves). Although under the New York
Convention we expect courts to enforce arbitration awards, expecting a court to
enforce an arbitration decision that overturned a court judgment seems incongruous when there is no hint that the original court decision was a consequence
of extra-legal forces.
As the number of investors’ claims challenging governments’ public policy
decisions mounted, there were cries for countries to abandon the investor-state
arbitration provisions of treaties they had previously ratified. Opposition came
from international economics and law scholars,199 NGOs, and even from some
international arbitration practitioners.200 Critics argued that national substantive
and procedural law were being pushed aside without open and reasoned debate,201 and that the threat of multi-million-dollar arbitration awards would
cause legislators to back away from regulating global corporations’ behavior,
and judges to be wary of interpreting domestic law in a fashion that might lead
to costly investor claims.202 Investor-state arbitration was invented to protect
corporations and investors from governments that operated outside the “rule of
198

JOHNSON ET AL., supra note 14, at 16–17.
Id. at 1; ISDS: The Devil in the Trade Deal, supra note 115. “ ‘If you think that all this
discussion of ISDS is scare-mongering, just have a look at what’s happened to Canada under
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with the United States. It’s all there
ready and waiting to happen to us [Australia].’ ” Professor of Law Thomas Faunce, Australian National University. According to ABCNet, the Canadian case Prof. Faunce referred to
was a claim brought under NAFTA by Ethyl, an American chemical company, against Canada, for banning MMT, a fuel additive. Canada agreed to settle the claim by paying Ethyl
$13 million, rescinding the ban, and publishing a statement declaring that MMT is safe.
200
ISDS: The Devil in the Trade Deal, supra note 115.
199

‘What has happened, in my view, is an expansion of the field well beyond the contemplation of
those who originally designed it,’ says Toby Landau, a leading arbitration lawyer who works
with ISDS. ‘The kinds of cases are expanding in terms of scope. They are covering all forms of
governmental activity wherever that activity might have an adverse impact on a foreign investment, for example cigarette packaging, regulation of carbon emissions, nuclear policy and taxation.’

Id.
201

JOHNSON ET AL., supra note 14, at 3.
ISDS provides significant substantive and procedural rights to individuals and corporations
based solely on their foreign nationality, and outsources development and interpretation of law
to private arbitrators insulated from crucial checks and balances. Through this grant of rights and
transfer of lawmaking power, ISDS threatens to undermine legal systems and policymaking at
the domestic level.

Id.
202

Billingsley, supra note 197, at 39–40.
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law”; now it was being turned into a weapon for corporations to undermine
laws properly adopted by democratic governments, critics charged.203
The addition of “transparency” provisions to the ICSID Rules and the
UNCITRAL Transparency Rules did not stem the flow of criticism: those
Rules were too easily waived, the critics said.204 Moreover, “transparency” did
nothing to mitigate the facts that investor-state disputes were being resolved by
a small group of “elite” corporate lawyers perceived to be biased in favor of
multinational corporations205 and that ambiguous BIT language was allowing

203

Elizabeth Warren, The Trans-Pacific Partnership Clause Everyone Should Oppose,
WASH. POST (Feb. 25, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/kill-the-disputesettlement-language-in-the-trans-pacific-partnership/2015/02/25/ec7705a2-bd1e-11e4-b274e5209a3bc9a9_story.html?utm_term=.668f8581dede [https://perma.cc/ZV2U-BUX6].
Why create these rigged, pseudo-courts at all? What’s so wrong with the U.S. judicial system?
Nothing, actually. But after World War II, some investors worried about plunking down their
money in developing countries, where the legal systems were not as dependable. They were
concerned that a corporation might build a plant one day only to watch a dictator confiscate it
the next. To encourage foreign investment in countries with weak legal systems, the United
States and other nations began to include ISDS in trade agreements. Those justifications don’t
make sense anymore, if they ever did. Countries in the TPP are hardly emerging economies with
weak legal systems. Australia and Japan have well-developed, well-respected legal systems, and
multinational corporations navigate those systems every day, but ISDS would preempt their
courts too. And to the extent there are countries that are riskier politically, market competition
can solve the problem. Countries that respect property rights and the rule of law—such as the
United States—should be more competitive, and if a company wants to invest in a country with
a weak legal system, then it should buy political-risk insurance.

See also The Arbitration Game: Investor-State Dispute Settlement, ECONOMIST (Oct. 11,
2014), http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21623
756-governments-are-souring-treaties-protect-foreign-investors-arbitration [https://perma.cc/
BQQ2-BP2F].
204
JONATHAN BONNITCHA ET AL., THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE INVESTMENT TREATY
REGIME 233 (2017).
205
See Stanislaw Soltysinski, The Dispute About the Legitimacy of Investment Arbitration:
Is the Principle of Equality of Parties an Outdated Concept?, in A REVOLUTION IN THE
INTERNATIONAL RULES OF LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF DON WALLACE, JR., supra note 168, at
315, 320–21 (citing data from a study by Pia Eberhardt & Cecilia Olivet showing that fifteen
arbitrators decided fifty-five percent of investor-state disputes in 2011, but disputing “critical
opinions that ‘elite’ arbitrators have formed a ‘mafia’ and many of them have not even
demonstrated expertise in international law.”); see also Robert Howse, India Should Not Let
Europe Undermine Its New BIT and TRIPs Flexibilities for Medicines, SUNDAY GUARDIAN
LIVE (Feb. 25, 2017), http://www.sundayguardianlive.com/opinion/8516-india-should-notlet-europe-undermine-its-new-bit-and-trips-flexibilities-medicines
[https://perma.cc/8YZZXAPY] (“The arbitrators constitute a small elite of lawyers dominated by West European males, who also act as counsel in cases on related matters, an egregious conflict of interest uncontrolled by arbitration rules. . . . It is a challenge to rein in . . .
expansion of [substantive] jurisdiction by arbitrator creativity, since arbitrators are judges for
hire, and when they grant jurisdiction they get paid handsomely to hear the case. . . . Impartial judges well qualified in public law and compensated mostly through a fixed salary would
be a big improvement over commercial lawyers and entrepreneurial academics who engage
in arbitration as a route to personal wealth.”).
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these decision-makers to favor corporations seeking to undermine national policies.206
Ultimately, opposition to investor-state arbitration provisions became an
important factor in controversy over newly proposed treaties intended to regulate trade and investment between certain nations: the Trans-Pacific Partnership
agreement (TPP)207 and the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership
agreement (TTIP).208 Since taking office, the Trump administration has begun
re-negotiating the North American Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which he has
loudly opposed as not being fair to the United States.209 Among the treaty chap206

Soltysinski, supra note 205, at 321–25. But see Susan D. Franck, Conflating Politics and
Development? Examining Investment Treaty Arbitration Outcomes, 55 VA. J. INT’L. L. 13,
65 (2014) (presenting empirical evidence disputing these claims, and showing “(1) states
won in equal or greater proportions than investors; (2) measures of central tendency indicated that investors won less than US$20 million on average overall; and (3) in those cases
where investors were successful, investors’ relative success was roughly 30% of the amount
claimed.”).
207
The proposed signatories to the multi-lateral TPP were Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile,
Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the United States, and Vietnam.
On his first day in office, President Donald Trump, who during his campaign referred to the
treaty as a “horrible deal,” withdrew the U.S. from the agreement. TPP: What Is It and Why
Does It Matter, BBC NEWS (Jan. 23, 2017), http://www.bbc.com/news/business-32498715
[https://perma.cc/JQE3-D6TJ]; see also Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), OFF. U.S. TRADE
REPRESENTATIVE, https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/trans-pacific-partn
ership (last visited Dec. 22, 2017) [https://perma.cc/QX3T-55FX]. Subsequently, the other
proposed signatories re-started negotiations. See Motoko Rich, TTP, the Trade Deal Trump
Killed, is Back in Talks Without U.S., N.Y TIMES (Jul. 14, 2017), https://www.nytime
s.com/2017/07/14/business/trans-pacific-partnership-trade-japan-china-globalization.html [ht
tps://perma.cc/E3MB-ZRZ6]. In November 2017, eleven Pacific Rim countries agreed to
move ahead with the agreement with the goal of obtaining signatures in early 2018. See
Shawn Donnan, Long Live the TPP – Pacific Trade Pact Survives Largely Intact, FIN.
TIMES, Nov. 3, 2017, https://www.ft.com/content/c5cdd3aa-c82d-11e7-ab18-7a9fb7d6163e
[https://perma.cc/9V4S-DU5A]. ISDS clause remains in the renegotiated agreement, but its
scope is restricted. Id. The long running controversy over the ISDS provision of the TPP
was not helped by the fact that its text was kept from the public. According to New York
Times reporter Jonathan Weisman, the ISDS clause in the TPP was to be classified for four
years after the agreement became effective or negotiations definitely failed; the Times said it
had obtained the provision from WikiLeaks. Ironically, the classified TPP ISDS clause was
reported to include transparency requirements. See Weisman, supra note 188.
208
The TTIP proposed to regulate a wide range of trade and investment between the United
States and the European Union. See U.S.-EU Joint Report on Progress to Date, OFF. U.S.
TRADE REPRESENTATIVE (Jan. 2017), https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/pr
ess-releases/2017/january/us-eu-joint-report-t-tip-progress-0 [https://perma.cc/C4ZE-XSK
E]. The proposed TTIP was a subject of controversy in both the U.S. and the EU, for a variety of reasons including the investor-state dispute resolution provisions. See, e.g., Stuart Jeffries, What Is TTIP and Why Should We Be Angry About It?, GUARDIAN (Aug. 3, 2015, 1:15
PM), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/aug/03/ttip-what-why-angry-transatl
antic-trade-investment-partnership-guide [https://perma.cc/MH4J-EUTL].
209
Ana Swanson, Trump’s Tough Talk on NAFTA Raises Prospects of Pact’s Demise, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 11, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/11/business/economy/nafta-trump.
html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/6PTF-8J48]. Both the TPP and NAFTA (the North American
Trade Agreement between the U.S., Canada and Mexico, ratified by the U.S. in 1994) are
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ters proposed for reform or elimination are provisions on state-state and investor-state dispute settlement.210 Meanwhile, a number of other countries have
announced their intentions to drop investor-state arbitration clauses from future
bilateral investment treaties or withdraw from current treaties with investorstate arbitration clauses.211
With concern rising that the framework of international investment is coming apart, there are multiple moves afoot to amend the substantive provisions of
bilateral and multilateral investment treaties: to safeguard countries’ rights to
regulate in the areas of health and safety, environmental protection, and labor
standards, to better balance national and investor obligations, and to strengthen
procedural fairness of investor-state arbitration.212 In their recently negotiated
trade and investment treaty (CETA), the European Union and Canada turned
their backs on investor-state arbitration in favor of a bilateral investment court
that is explicitly intended to lay the basis for a future multilateral investment
court that would resolve disputes between EU member nations and their trading
parties.213 The Canada-EU investment court would be a permanent body with
judges appointed and paid for by the two countries, operating under
UNCITRAL transparency rules.214 It remains to be seen whether the new
examples of what Puig terms regional trade agreements (RTAS), different from agreements
negotiated by the World Trade Organization in its exclusive application to a relatively small
number of countries. Puig has termed the emergence of RTAs “mini-lateralism.” RTAs
complicate an already complicated international dispute resolution framework providing nations with strategic opportunities to re-litigate issues under a different treaty’s provisions
when they have failed to prevail under another treaty’s dispute resolution clause. See Puig,
supra note165, at 3; see also Patrick Gillespie, NAFTA: What It Is and Why Trump Hates It,
CNN: CNN MONEY (Nov. 15, 2016, 5:17 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2016/11/15/news/eco
nomy/trump-what-is-nafta/index.html [https://perma.cc/7NUA-84K5] (stating that the
North-American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), signed into law by the U.S. in 1994, is an
example of a regional trade agreement that the U.S. ratified.
210
See Tonda Maccharles, Agreeing on How to Disagree Is One of the Biggest NAFTA Debates, STAR.COM, (Aug. 16, 2017), https://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2017/08/16/agreei
ng-on-how-to-disagree-is-one-of-the-biggest-nafta-debates.html [https://perma.cc/4QYD-EJ
72]. See also Ioannis Glinavos, The Big Challenge of the NAFTA Negotiations: Dispute Settlement, CONVERSATION (Aug. 14, 2017, 6:56 AM) https://theconversation.com/the-bigchallenge-of-the-nafta-renegotiations-dispute-settlement-82394 [https://perma.cc/MZ75-FD
YE].
211
Among these (in addition to Australia) are Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, India, Indonesia,
South Africa, South Korea, and Venezuela. Brazil is reported to have steadily declined to
negotiate treaties with investor-state arbitration clauses. Soltysinski, supra note 205, at 324;
The Arbitration Game, supra note 203.
212
See IIA ISSUES NOTE, supra note 182, at 9 (presenting examples of recent substantive
reforms that include specifying criteria arbitrators should consider when deciding whether a
country’s decision qualifies as an “indirect expropriation” (i.e. akin to Philip Morris’ claim
regarding Australia’s plain packaging law) and identifying “public policy exceptions” that
exclude certain national decisions from review by arbitrators).
213
A Future Multilateral Investment Court, EUR. COMMISSION (Dec. 13, 2016), http://europa
.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-16-4350_en.htm [https://perma.cc/4BZ5-XNH5].
214
Each country will appoint five members, and an additional five “neutrals” will be chosen
collaboratively. All will serve for initial terms of five years, renewable for another five
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CETA investment court system will survive scrutiny by the European Court of
Justice and be deemed compatible with EU laws.215 However, the EU parliament is pushing forward with consultation on establishing a multi-lateral investment court, drawing in part on the CETA model and in part on agreements
recently negotiated between the EU and Vietnam and the EU and Singapore.216
The issues highlighted in current analyses and debate are appointment and remuneration of adjudicators, transparency of process and outcomes, costs and
cost allocation, remedies, and appellate rights.217
IV. RE-INVENTING ARBITRATION
For many years, domestic arbitration in the United States, international
commercial arbitration, and investor-state arbitration have evolved on parallel
but separate tracks, each responding to different political, economic, and social
circumstances. Their evolution, however, has had (at least) two features in
common:
(1) an expansion in substantive scope, from a relatively narrow and homogeneous set of private nature disputes, to a more broad and diverse set of disputes with significant public policy implications; and
(2) in response, the transformation of the procedure itself from an informal,
streamlined, and highly private process, to a process resembling a public
adjudicative forum, with formal rules, time consuming (and increasingly
expensive) due process protections, precedential decision-making, and—at
least in certain instances—public access to process and outcomes.

years. The judges may not serve as private arbitrators, party experts, or legal counsel in any
investment dispute during their term on the court. A panel of three will be chosen from this
bench at random to hear each dispute. Parties may appeal the awards to a separate appeal
tribunal for legal error or manifest errors of fact. The details of the tribunal selection are yet
to be decided. The final awards will be enforceable in the courts of Canada and EU member
states. However, enforceability elsewhere is uncertain as the “court” arguably is not covered
by the New York Convention. Mark Mangan, Commentary, The EU Succeeds in Establishing a Permanent Investment Court in Its Trade Treaties with Canada and Vietnam,
MEALEY’S INT’L ARB. REP., May 2016, at 2–4; see also Hogan Lovells, CETA Paves the Way
for Investment Court System, LEXOLOGY (Dec. 6, 2016), http://www.lexology.com/library/de
tail.aspx?g=cddc2b70-9425-418f-bcf1-512cb8483100 [https://perma.cc/N82G-VZ9V] (explaining, moreover, that the viability of the Court itself is in question: Belgium has challenged it on the basis of inconsistency with EU law).
215
EU Court to Judge Controversial Investment Rules in Canada Trade Deal, CLIENTEARTH
(Sept. 6, 2017), https://www.clientearth.org/eu-court-to-judge-controversial-investment-rules
-in-canada-trade-deal/Nonet [https://perma.cc/P7XX-GMEL].
216
See STEFFEN HINDELANG & TEOMAN M. HAGEMEYER, EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT’S COMM.
ON INT’L TRADE, IN PURSUIT OF AN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT COURT: RECENTLY
NEGOTIATED INVESTMENT CHAPTERS IN EU COMPREHENSIVE FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS IN
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 1 (2017), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD
/2017/603844/EXPO_STU(2017)603844_EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/LN2Z-MR67].
217
Id. at 15–21.
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The result has been a new form of dispute resolution that is neither fully
private nor fully public, eschewing, in an increasing variety of circumstances,
the advantages that arbitration’s early business person proponents hoped to
achieve by substituting arbitration for court dispute resolution, without guaranteeing in these or other circumstances the protections public adjudication can
offer for less powerful disputants and the public interest.
There is no evidence that this transformation of domestic and international
commercial arbitration was intended by the justices who built the doctrinal edifice that supports arbitration in the United States today.218 Indeed, it is uncertain whether these justices understand how far arbitration in the commercial
arena has strayed from the vision of quick and inexpensive dispute resolution
that the Court has long cited as the basis for a public policy favoring arbitration.219 Nor is it clear that international treaty negotiators understood, until recently, the growing public antipathy to using private arbitral processes to resolve conflicts between multinational corporate investors and democraticallyelected and appointed public officials and the threat that this antipathy poses to
international trade and investment treaty-making in the future.220
A.

Domestic Arbitration in the United States

As commercial arbitration has become more formal, procedurally complex,
time-consuming, and expensive, the commercial dispute resolution market has

218

See Allied-Bruce Terminix Co., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 283 (1995) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring) (“over the past decade, the Court has abandoned all pretense of ascertaining
congressional intent with respect to the Federal Arbitration Act, building instead, case by
case, an edifice of its own creation.”); see also AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563
U.S. 333, 348 (2011) (“the switch from bilateral to class arbitration sacrifices the principal
advantage of arbitration—its informality—and makes the process slower, more costly, and
more likely to generate procedural morass than final judgment.”).
219
See e.g. AT&T Mobility, 563 U.S. at 344–45 (“The point of affording parties discretion in
designing arbitration processes is to allow for efficient, streamlined procedures tailored to
the type of dispute . . . the informality of arbitral proceedings is itself desirable, reducing the
cost and increasing the speed of dispute resolution.” (internal citations omitted)). See also
Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2316 (2013) (Kagan, J., dissenting)
(“The effective-vindication rule has thus operated year in and year out without undermining,
much less “destroy[ing],” the prospect of speedy dispute resolution that arbitration secures.”).
220
Although discussions leading up to the formal launch of negotiations of the TTIP began
in 2011, opposition to the proposed dispute resolution provisions does not seem to have attracted high level government attention until 2015. See Vicki L. Birchfield, Negotiating the
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership: Comparing U.S. and EU Motivations, Oppositions and Public Opinion 1 (Ga. Tech Ctr for European and Transatlantic Studies, Working Paper No. GTJMCE-2015-2, 2015). Hensler attended a session of the U.K. Law Society’s February 2015 “Global Law Summit” at which a speaker described trade negotiators as
surprised that the investor-state dispute settlement clause in the proposed TTIP proved to be
a significant stumbling-block in securing support for the treaty; seasoned trade negotiators,
he said, were focused on the substantive aspects of the proposed agreement.
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shifted towards mediation,221 and some industries that once were pillars of the
arbitration market now advise their members to consider using other dispute
resolution methods before adopting arbitration.222 Many business decisionmakers, however, continue to choose arbitration for their business-to-business
disputes, notwithstanding their complaints about costs and delay. By inference,
these decision-makers increasingly choose arbitration for their wholly domestic
disputes not because they perceive it to be quick or inexpensive but rather—
despite the transaction costs—because it allows them to resolve their differences in private, with no public record. Whether “public policy” should support
such a choice is worthy of more public debate than has been accorded to the
question to date.
The principle that transacting parties should both be permitted to voluntarily agree to an extrajudicial dispute resolution process and, having once chosen
such, held to such agreements is key to U.S. courts’ arbitration jurisprudence.
However, in extending enforcement of arbitration agreements to employment
and consumer contracts of adhesion that require arbitration, the U.S. Supreme
Court has honored the principle in word only. To protect their integrity (and to
their credit) leading arbitration providers have created “due process protocols”
that extend some of the protections of public adjudication to employees and
consumers and attempt to create a more level playing field between the latter
and the more powerful institutions that employ them and sell them products and
services.223 The success of such protocols in protecting employees and consumers is far from clear, and available evidence suggests that consumers have
little understanding of the differences between arbitration—whatever its
form—and litigation.224 Moreover, as a result of confidentiality provisions, employment and consumer arbitration continue to offer powerful individuals and
corporations the ability to hide egregious behavior from public view.225
Having endorsed the use of arbitration in the employment and consumer
domain, the U.S. Supreme Court opened a door to corporations wishing to use
arbitration as a means of denying their employees and customers collective
221

Deborah R. Hensler, The Private in Public, The Public in Private: The Blurring Boundary Between Public and Private Dispute Resolution, in FORMALISATION AND FLEXIBILISATION
IN DISPUTE RESOLUTION 45, (Joachim Zekoll et al. eds., 2014) (discussing the emergence of
mediation as a preferred dispute resolution procedure for business disputants).
222
See generally BRUNER & O’CONNOR supra note 101.
223
See discussion supra Sections I.C.2–3.
224
CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, ARBITRATION STUDY: REPORT TO CONGRESS, PURSUANT
TO DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT § 1028(A) 11
(2015).
225
Recent revelations of allegations of sexual harassment of employees have provoked questioning of the appropriateness of mandatory pre-dispute arbitration agreements, at least as
pertain to these sorts of charges. See Gretchen Carlson, How to Encourage More Women to
Report Sexual Harassment, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 10, 2017) https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/1
0/opinion/women-reporting-sexual-harassment.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/7QU2-P5YS].
However, the prevalence of confidential settlement agreements in litigated cases dilutes the
power of this critique.
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pursuit of remedies for collective harm. Ironically, defendants’ efforts to preclude class actions by imposing arbitration on employees and consumers
brought the differences between public courts and private arbitration into
sharper focus for some justices than evinced in the Court’s prior decisions on
arbitration.226 Forced to consider the differences in capacity to manage collective claiming between courts and private arbitration providers, the U.S. Supreme Court concluded that it would be a mistake to grant the latter the authority granted to federal and state judges to determine when it is appropriate to
permit claimants to proceed in class form and to protect class members against
the agency costs inherent in representative collective proceedings. Rather than
concluding that collective legal claims properly belong in public courts, however, the Court acceded to corporations’ desires to deny such claims altogether.227
It would be quixotic to propose that the U.S. Supreme Court reverse the
past several decades of its arbitration jurisprudence.228 Its decisions, however,
rest on statutory interpretation. The U.S. Congress could reverse the Court’s
policies with regard to employment and consumer arbitration with new legislation. By returning domestic commercial arbitration to the purely commercial
sphere, Congress could re-define the boundary between private arbitration and
public adjudication and preserve each for its most appropriate uses. While it is
wildly wishful thinking to expect such action in the near future, as we have
seen recently, elections can bring sharp shifts in legislative decision-making.
B. International Commercial Arbitration
Although international commercial arbitration has been subject to the same
complexification as domestic commercial arbitration, absent an international
convention on the enforcement of judgments or an international commercial
court, arbitration remains the best available option for trans-national business
disputes. The proliferation of international commercial arbitration tribunals offers a potential for innovative dispute system design and the possibility that
market competition will result over time in the emergence of optimal procedures. Increased transparency with regard to process and outcomes would enable such competition, which might in turn lead to a greater appetite for transparency among entrepreneurial arbitration providers eager to prove their
superiority to others.
The increasingly globalized business environment will likely produce an
increasing number of trans-national disputes requiring an international com226

AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 348–51 (2011).
Id.
228
Just ten years after Southland, Justice O’Connor felt compelled to concur in the decision
in Allied-Bruce Terminix on the grounds of stare decisis, notwithstanding dissenters’ argument that a wrongly-determined case should not be accorded such deference. Allied-Bruce
Terminix Co., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 283 (1995) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
227
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mercial arbitration forum, which may in turn lead to growth in the number of
expert arbitrators and perhaps in their diversity as well. While in the domestic
sphere, there is room for robust debate about the appropriateness of substituting
private dispute resolution for public adjudication and an argument for preserving the distinctiveness of each, in the international commercial arbitration arena, there is currently no obvious alternative to private dispute resolution. As a
result, what is needed in the international commercial arbitration domain is independent debate about procedural design, empirical analysis to support that
debate, and objective consideration of the benefits and limitations of arbitral
decision-making. Unfortunately, the fact that those with the most expertise in
international commercial arbitration may stand to lose financially as a result of
changes in current rules and practices poses an obstacle to such consideration.
C. Investor-State Arbitration
The situation with regard to investor-state arbitration is more vexed than
the situation of traditional international commercial arbitration. As with international commercial arbitration, there is currently no obvious alternative to arbitration. The issues presented in investor-state arbitration, however, are more
likely to have direct consequences for the public than the issues in ordinary international commercial arbitration. Moreover, its historical provenance is much
more recent; although investor-state arbitration dates back to the 1960s, the
dramatic increase in investor-state disputes occurred much more recently. As a
result, investor-state arbitration is arguably less entrenched than international
commercial arbitration and more amenable to regime change.
Proposals to establish an international investment court offer promise of
protecting important public values in disputes that implicate important national
interests, such as public health, environmental protection, and product safety. In
particular, proposals to establish a public process for appointing judges to decide investor-state disputes and to pay these judges and subsidize court operations from public funds, address concerns about bias in investor-state arbitration. Heightened transparency standards (by comparison with ISID and
UNCITRAL rules) would provide objective evidence of the consequences of
the new court’s decision-making, as well as offer the possibility for thirdparties to observe and participate in hearings.
A few bi-lateral investment treaties have already substituted an investment
court paradigm for traditional investor-state arbitration in their dispute settlement clauses. Extending the concept to multi-lateral treaties will be challenging, but there appears to be agreement in the EU that working towards this goal
is desirable. If international investment courts were to proliferate through the
re-negotiation of BITS, pressure might mount for even those countries, such as
the United States, which have traditionally been hostile to the idea of international courts, to substitute a more publicly-oriented court paradigm for traditional investor state arbitration in its bi-lateral trade agreements. Ultimately, an
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international investment court also could provide an attractive alternative to arbitration for trans-national commercial disputes.
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